Catagory:Derivative Action

1
Higher Education Management Group, Inc. v. Matthews, C.A. No. 911-VCP (November 3, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)
2
In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litig., Civil Action No. 4521-VCG (July 30, 2014) (Vice Chancellor Glasscock)

Higher Education Management Group, Inc. v. Matthews, C.A. No. 911-VCP (November 3, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)

By David Bernstein and Max Kaplan

On November 3, 2014, the Delaware Chancery Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss derivative claims in Higher Education Management Group, Inc. v. Mathews, C.A. No. 911-VCP (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.), after finding, among other things, that plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity facts showing demand upon nominal defendant’s board would have been futile.  In this case, defendant corporation’s subsidiary, Aspen University, paid out nearly $2.2 million in what were apparently expense reimbursements between 2003 and 2011.  These outlays were never recorded in the firm’s accounts—a fact discovered by management through a November 2011 audit. Apparently, rather than recording the expense, which would have required Aspen to restate previous years’ financial statements, management chose to treat the $2.2 million as a secured loan receivable owed by Aspen University’s former CEO—plaintiff Patrick Spada—with the intention of taking a write-off in the future.  Spada denied there ever was a loan and alleged that defendant officers and directors materially misrepresented the corporation’s finances by knowingly mischaracterizing the $2.2 million as a loan.

The court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs’ accusations, and it instead found that plaintiffs failed to either make a demand on the board or sufficiently plead that such a demand would be futile.  Plaintiffs had argued that the director defendants had made knowing misrepresentations that exposed them to a “substantial likelihood” of liability, and therefore all the directors were “interested” for purposes of satisfying the demand futility test.  However, Plaintiffs pled events that, if taken as true, showed only that two directors knew that there was no loan.  With regard to all the other directors, plaintiffs alleged only general knowledge of the loan being fake, attributing identical actions to all of the directors as a group without making specific allegations with regard to individual directors.  According to the court, “such broad and identical assertions . . . do not meet the requirements of pleading facts with particularity.”  Having found that the facts pled by the plaintiffs were only sufficient to show that a minority of directors were “interested,” the court concluded that a demand had not been shown to be futile and dismissed the claim.

Higher Education Management Group, Inc. v. Mathews

In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litig., Civil Action No. 4521-VCG (July 30, 2014) (Vice Chancellor Glasscock)

By David Bernstein and Priya Chadha

In In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litig., Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III held that a terminated trust that has not yet distributed to its beneficiaries shares of a corporation, cannot bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. It “can take only those actions related to preserving its assets for purposes of distribution and wind-up, together with those actions for which the trust instrument specifies.”

The Gregory M. Raiff 2000 Trust (the “Trust”) was established in 2000.  The terms of the Trust Instrument held that it was to terminate in 2002 and distribute all of its assets to another trust.  However, the Trust assets, which included shares of Jenzabar, were never actually distributed after the Trust terminated in 2002.  After the trustee filed this derivative action on behalf of the Trust in 2013, Jenzabar filed a motion to dismiss the derivative suit, arguing that the Trust lacked the capacity to sue because it had terminated.  The Plaintiff countered that because the Trust had never distributed its assets, it still had the capacity to bring a derivative suit due to the fact that it still held Jenzabar stock.

Vice Chancellor Glasscock rejected this argument.  He said that Massachusetts law, which governed the Trust, restricted the powers of a trustee of a terminated trust to what’s necessary to “preserve the trust property while winding up the trust and delivering any trust property to the beneficiary.”  He said that post termination, the only litigation in which the Trust could engage was defensive action necessary to preserve its assets, pursuing litigation was not encompassed within the Trust’s limited powers and thus, it lacked the capacity to pursue the derivative action.

InReJenzabar

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