In In re Rouse Properties, Inc. Fiduciary Litigation, C.A. No. 12194-VCS, the George Leon Family Trust and Dr. Robert A Corwin (the “Plaintiffs”) sought to recover damages on behalf of Rouse Properties Inc. (“Rouse”) stockholders, for breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties against Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (“Brookfield”) and five Rouse directors individually arising out of a July 2016 merger between two mall real estate holding companies (the “Merger”). The court dismissed all claims finding that Brookfield was not a minority controlling stockholder of Rouse and did not wield undue influence over the board of directors of Rouse in general or during Merger discussions and that the Plaintiffs failed to well plead that the stockholder vote approving the Merger was uninformed or coerced.
In In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. Section 220 Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 2017-0681-TMR (Ch. Ct February 28, 2018) certain stockholders (“Plaintiffs”) of UnitedHealth Group, Inc. (“UnitedHealth”) sent a books and records inspection demand to UnitedHealth relying on a complaint in a type of whistleblower (qui tam) action alleging that UnitedHealth engaged in improper Medicare billing, United States ex rel. Poehling v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. (the “Qui Tam Action”). The Qui Tam Action was based in part on a 5-year investigation by the US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and included depositions of 20 of UnitedHealth’s employees and production by UnitedHealth of over 600,000 documents. Plaintiffs made their demand in order to investigate mismanagement or misconduct, possible breaches of fiduciary duties and the independence and disinterestedness of the board. UnitedHealth rejected the demand and a trial was held on January 9, 2018. UnitedHealth argued that Plaintiffs were not entitled to inspection of books and records because they lacked a credible basis to infer wrongdoing or mismanagement based on the Qui Tam Action and because the alleged activities of UnitedHealth were not illegal. The Court found that Plaintiffs’ demand stated a proper purpose and a credible basis from which a court could infer mismanagement or wrongdoing.
Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, et al. came before the Delaware Court of Chancery as a dispute over a merger between Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (“ETP”) and Regency Energy Partners LP (“Regency”) for an exchange ratio of 0.4066 and a cash payment of $0.32 per common unit of Regency (the “Merger”).
In Cumming v. Edens, et al., C.A. No. 13007-VCS (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2018), the Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a derivative suit for breach of fiduciary duties brought by a stockholder of New Senior Investment Group, Inc. (“New Senior”) against New Senior’s board of directors (the “Board”) and related parties in connection with New Senior’s $640 million acquisition of Holiday Acquisition Holdings LLC (“Holiday”). The Court made clear that compliance with Section 144 does not necessarily provide a safe harbor against claims for breach of fiduciary duty and invoke business judgment review of an interested transaction. Because the complaint alleged with specificity “that the Board acted out of self-interest or with allegiance to interest other than the stockholders,” the court applied the entire fairness standard of review and concluded that the transaction was not fair to New Senior stockholders. Read More
In Benjamin Feldman v. YIDL Trust, C.A. No. 2017-0253-AGB (Del. Ch. November 7, 2017), plaintiff Benjamin Feldman brought a motion for summary judgment under Court of Chancery Rule 56 for dissolution of a jointly-held Delaware corporation pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 273. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that YIDL Trust made voluntary and knowing concessions of fact during the judicial proceedings that conclusively established the prerequisites for a judicial order of dissolution under Section 273.
In Wilkin v. Narachi, et al., and Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., Civil Action No. 12412-VCMR (Del. Ch. February 28, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss brought by defendants (“Defendants”), directors and officers of biopharmaceutical company Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc. (“Orexigen”), for failure to plead demand futility under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. The Court ruled that the plaintiff, a stockholder of Orexigen (“Plaintiff”), did not plead sufficient facts to show that a substantial likelihood of liability prevented the directors from exercising independent and disinterested business judgment when considering a demand to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation.
In this case, Vice Chancellor Laster issued a memorandum opinion in Edward M. Weil, et al v. Vereit Operating Partnership, L.P., C.A. No. 2017-0613-JTL, granting partial summary judgment in favor of individual plaintiffs, who served as senior officers and members of the board of directors of Vereit, Inc, (“Vereit”) the sole general partner of Vereit Operating Partnership, L.P. (the “Partnership”). Read More
In Aloha Power Company, LLC v. Regenesis Power, LLC, the Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part plaintiff’s action to compel inspection and production of certain books and records pursuant to provisions in the defendant’s operating agreement and the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act. The Court held that the operating agreement expressly required production of certain books and records without demand for inspection and determined whether there existed a proper purpose for inspection for the remaining demanded books and records.
Southpaw Credit Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. v. Roma Restaurant Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0059-TMR (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 2018) came before the Delaware Court of Chancery as a dispute over control of the board of directors of Roma Restaurant Holdings, Inc. (“Roma” or the “Company”). Plaintiffs were a stockholder group that had taken a majority position in Roma’s common stock. After learning of Plaintiffs’ majority position, the Roma board adopted a new equity compensation plan and issued sufficient shares of restricted stock to Roma employees to dilute Plaintiffs below a majority ownership position. Plaintiffs considered the dilutive restricted stock issuances as invalid for a number of reasons, including the Company’s failure to obtain contractually mandated stockholder agreement joinder documents from each recipient before issuance, and presented Roma with a written consent that removed two of Roma’s current directors (the “Defendant Directors”) and replaced them with Plaintiffs’ nominees. Roma contested the validity of Plaintiffs’ written consent and the case came before the Court under Section 225 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) to determine the proper composition of Roma’s board of directors. Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves found that the disputed restricted stock issuances were void and could not be counted toward a stockholder vote.
In Christopher Miller, et al., v. HCP & Company, et al., memorandum opinion 180201, the Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss because the underlying Limited Liability Company Agreement did not contain a “gap” for an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to fill. Rather, the Court of Chancery held that the Limited Liability Company Agreement contained negotiated investor favorable provisions regarding good faith and fair dealing, thus undercutting any argument that the Court of Chancery should read an implied covenant into the operating agreement.
By Lisa Stark and Rashida Stevens
In Chatham Asset Management, LLC v. Papanier, C.A. No. 2017-008-AGB (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the plaintiffs, Chatham Asset Management, LLC, Chatham Fund, LP, and Chatham Asset High Yield Master Fund, Ltd. (collectively, “Chatham”), pleaded sufficient facts to avoid dismissal of a claim that the director defendants of Twin River Worldwide Holdings, Inc. (“Twin River”) breached their fiduciary duties by making materially false and misleading statements in tender offer materials. Read More
In Lavin v. West Corporation, C.A. No. 2017-0547-JRS (Del. Ch. December 29, 2017), the Court of Chancery held that stockholder plaintiff Mark Lavin (“Lavin”) had adequately demonstrated a credible basis from which the Court could infer that wrongdoing had occurred regarding the merger of West Corporation (the “Company”) and Apollo Global Management (“Apollo”) in support of Lavin’s Section 220 demand for inspection, and that a Corwin defense (that the transaction at issue was approved by a majority of disinterested and informed stockholders) is not a bar to an otherwise properly supported Section 220 demand for inspection.