In Akrout v. Jarkoy, No. 2017-0473-JRS (Del. Ch. July 10, 2018), the plaintiff Nabil Akrout sought a declaration that the dissolution of Intelligent Security Systems International, Inc., Delaware corporation (“ISSI”), was void, and alleged that three individual director-defendants had breached their fiduciary duties to him by failing to apprise him of ISSI’s dissolution and financial condition. Akrout also alleged that the dissolution deprived him of accrued salary and dividends.
In Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. v. Globalstar, Inc., C.A. No. 218-0351-TMR (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018), plaintiff Mudrick Capital Management L.P. (“Mudrick Capital”), a minority stockholder of defendant Globalstar, Inc. (the “Company”), brought a demand under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporate Law (“Section 220”) to inspect certain communications and documents relating to the Company’s proposed merger with Thermo Acquisitions, Inc. (“Thermo”). The Delaware Court of Chancery granted Mudrick Capital’s demand for certain emails, communications and valuation materials relating to the merger, and denied Mudrick Capital’s demand for certain internal draft materials.
In Triple H Family L.P. v. Jerry Neal , C.A. No. 12294-VCMR (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the member-manager of Omni Insurance Group, LLC (“Omni”) breached his fiduciary duties to the company when he misled Omni’s largest customer about lapses in the customer’s insurance coverage. Additionally, the court held that although the other member of Omni owed fiduciary duties to Omni as a de facto manager, that member did not breach his fiduciary duties when he directed business away from Omni after the parties had already agreed to dissolve. Finally, the court held that judicial dissolution of Omni was not required because the members had previously agreed to dissolve Omni, and, as such, all that was required was a winding-up of Omni’s business. Read More
In In re Straight Path Communications Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0486-SG (Del. Ch. June 25, 2018), the Court of Chancery, denied a motion to dismiss, finding that the transfer of an indemnification claim to the controller of a company was “sufficiently intertwined” with the company’s sale for the stockholders to make the Plaintiff’s claim a direct claim instead of a derivative claim. The Court stated that when a controller uses his control to extract a special benefit in a sale, at the expense of the consideration to the stockholders, both the injury and the recovery run directly in favor of the former stockholders. The Court also found that, the controller’s actions related to the purchase of the indemnification claim and other assets from the company for “a manifestly unfair price” were sufficient to state a viable claim for breach of fiduciary duties.
By: Jessica Pearlman and Corinne Smith
In Alarm.com Holdings, Inc. v. ABS Capital Partners, Inc., et al. (C.A. No. 2017-0583-JTL (Del. Ch. June 15, 2018), plaintiff Alarm.com, Inc. (“Alarm”) brought suit against defendants ABS Capital Partners, Inc., ABS Partners V, LLC, and ABS Partners VII, LLC (collectively “ABS”) asserting: (1) the misappropriation of trade secrets under the Delaware Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“DUTSA”), and (2) common law misappropriation of confidential information. Both claims related to ABS’s investments and board appointments in both Alarm and one of its direct competitors. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed both claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), ruling that (1) it was not reasonably conceivable that ABS engaged in misappropriation under DUTSA, and (2) DUTSA preempts Alarm’s common law claim because it is based on the same wrongful conduct as its trade secret claim. Read More
In Steinberg on behalf of Hortonworks, Inc. v. Bearden, C.A. No. 2017-0286-AGB (Del. Ch. May 30, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the stockholder plaintiff’s derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duties under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, because the plaintiff failed to make a pre-suit demand or demonstrate that doing so would be futile. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to plead particularized facts sufficient to raise reasonable doubt that a majority of the directors on the Hortonworks, Inc. board could have exercised their independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a pre-suit demand. Read More
In CertiSign Holding, Inc. v. Sergio Kulikovsky, C.A. No. 12055-VCS, the Court found that Sergio Kulikovsky (“Kulikovsky”), a former director of CertiSign Holding, Inc. (“CertiSign”), had breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to CertiSign by actively sabotaging corporate self-help efforts in a bid to advance his own personal objectives. The Court also denied Kulikovsky’s counterclaims for judicial validation of certain stock option grants and the assumption by CertiSign of a debt owed to Kulikovsky, and awarded Certisign damages in the amount of $390,455.20 for the “legal fees and expenses incurred by CertiSign in connection with its efforts to remedy its defective capitalization and board issues.”
In Full Value Partners, L.P. v. Swiss Helvetia Fund, Inc., et. al., C.A. No. 2017-0303-AGB (Del. Ch. June 7, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the plaintiff stockholder’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under the corporate benefit doctrine because the plaintiff’s claim in the underlying stockholder litigation was meritorious when filed and produced a benefit to the defendant corporation.
In City of North Miami Beach General Employees’ Retirement Plan, et al. v. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., et al., (C.A. No. 2018-0227-AGB (Del. Ch. June 1, 2018)), the Court of Chancery held that the term “constituent corporation” as used in Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law means only an entity that actually is being merged or combined with another entity in a merger or consolidation and does not include a parent of such entities. Thus, the Court ruled that the Dr Pepper stockholder plaintiffs are not entitled to appraisal rights because Dr Pepper is not a constituent corporation, but rather the parent of one of two corporations to be merged in connection with the proposed transaction.
In In re Bay Hills Emerging Partners I, L.P., et al (C.A. No. 2018-0234-JRS), Vice Chancellor Slights denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss claims related to their “for cause” removal as general partners, instead staying the action pending resolution of the claims filed in a Kentucky court. Regarding the forum selection issue, the Court of Chancery held that “the inclusion of the consent language and the lack of language indicating that Kentucky is the exclusive forum—such as by the use of the term ‘any’—[the LPA] does not contain clear language indicating that jurisdiction and venue must lie exclusively in Kentucky.”
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448-VCL (Del. Ch. May 21, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion for reargument of its earlier decision setting the appraisal value of the shares of Aruba Networks, Inc. (“Aruba” or the “Company”) at the time of its acquisition by Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”). Although the merger agreement offered $24.67 per share of the Company, and the Company ultimately suggested that the fair value of the Company’s shares was $19.75, the Court of Chancery set the fair value of the Company’s shares at $17.13. In denying the motion for reargument, the Court of Chancery reiterated its position that the trial court must independently determine the fair value of the shares in an appraisal proceeding and that the market price of a publicly traded firm can itself be an accurate measurement of fair value.
In CBS Corporation, et al. v. National Amusements, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 2018-0342-AGB, the Court of Chancery denied a motion for temporary retraining order brought by CBS Corporation (“CBS”) and five independent directors of CBS (the “Plaintiffs”) to restrain controlling shareholders, Shari Redstone, her father Sumner Redstone, National Amusements, Inc. (“NAI”), NAI Entertainment Holdings LLC, and the Sumner M. Redstone National Amusements Trust (the “Defendants”) from taking certain actions that would interfere with the governance of CBS or other proposed actions of the board of directors of CBS. The Court found that there was no precedent for the type of relief requested by Plaintiff and that no extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant the grant of such relief. Read More