In In re PLX Technology, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 9880-VCL (Del. Ch. October 16, 2018), the Delaware Chancery Court found that the actions of an activist stockholder in the context of a sale transaction aided and abetted the defendant board of directors in a breach of its fiduciary duty of disclosure but that there was insufficient evidence that the breach ultimately resulted in damages.
CSH Theatres, LLC v. Nederlander of San Francisco Associates, CA No. 9830-VCMR (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018) concerns the dramatic break-up of a prominent theater company partnership in San Francisco involving claims and counterclaims alleging violations of contractual and fiduciary duties and charges of self-dealing and bad faith conduct. The Delaware Court of Chancery found that no enforceable contract to renew the lease to San Francisco’s Curran Theater existed but the Court did grant the theater operator a declaratory judgment that the principals of the owner had breached their common law fiduciary duties while they were also serving as managers of the theater operator.
In Jack L. Marchand II v. John W. Barnhill, Jr., et al, the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, finding that Plaintiff failed to plead particularized facts that an appeal for board action on the complaint would have been futile or that a majority of the company’s board lacked the independence needed to respond.
In Trascent Management Consulting, LLC v. George Bouri, C.A. No. 10915-VCMR (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2018), the Court of Chancery declared a limited liability company agreement unenforceable and rescinded a related employment agreement with the defendant, George Bouri, due to Bouri’s fraudulent and false statements that induced the plaintiff’s principal, Rakesh Kishan, to form Trascent Management Consulting, LLC (“Trascent”), and for Kishan and Trascent to enter into the LLC agreement and the employment agreement with Bouri. In addition, the Court awarded certain attorneys’ fees and costs to Trascent as sanctions for defendant’s continued fraudulent and false statements during the litigation proceedings. Read More
In a letter opinion, Manti Holdings, LLC et al. v. Authentix Acquisition Co, Civil Action No. 2017-0887-SG (Del. Ch. October 1, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the petitioning stockholders’ cross-motion for statutory appraisal rights under Section 262 of the DGCL, ruling that the stockholders were contractually barred from asserting such rights regarding a merger of respondent Authentix Acquisition Co. (the “Company” and “Respondent”). The Court held that the terms of a stockholders agreement (the “SA”) imposed a duty on Manti Holdings, LLC and the other moving stockholders (“Petitioners”) to forebear from the exercise of their appraisal rights, and granted Respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment on the statutory entitlement to appraisal rights.
In Charles Almond, et al. v. Glenhill Advisors LLC, et al., C.A. No. 10477-CB, Chancellor Bouchard ruled in favor of the defendants, directors of furniture company Design Within Reach Inc. (the “Company”) and Glenhill Capital Management LP (“Glenhill”), on all of the plaintiff-investors’ claims relating to the 2014 acquisition of DWR by Herman Miller, Inc. (“Herman Miller”). In doing so, Chancellor Bouchard judicially validated certain measures taken by Herman Miller to rectify an error that had diluted its ownership stake in the Company. Chancellor Bouchard also dismissed claims challenging transactions through which the Company’s board members received additional equity in the Company before the merger, holding that because these claims were derivative in nature, the plaintiffs’ standing to bring such claims were extinguished because of the merger.
In Village Green Holding, LLC, et al. v. Jonathan Holtzman, et al., Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves granted plaintiff Village Green Holding, LLC’s (“Village Green”) motion for preliminary injunction regarding the enforcement of a forum selection clause and defendant Jonathan Holtzman’s (“Holtzman”) attempt to litigate a dispute in a separate forum. In rendering its decision, the Court illustrated the circumstances under which it will enjoin litigation that is pending in an alternate forum pursuant to a contract’s forum selection clause.
By Joanna Diakos and Tom Sperber
In Kyle Ellis (AbbVie, Inc.) v. Richard A. Gonzalez, et al., the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed a derivative suit for failing to make a demand and to allege particularized facts demonstrating that demand would have been futile. Kyle Ellis (“Plaintiff”) alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the CEO of AbbVie, Inc. (“AbbVie”), Richard A. Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), and the individual members of AbbVie’s board of directors (“Director Defendants”) in connection with a proposed but ultimately abandoned corporate inversion between pharmaceutical giants AbbVie and Shire plc (“Shire”). The Court held that because AbbVie’s certificate of incorporation contained a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory clause, Plaintiff had to allege that a majority of the board faced a substantial likelihood of liability for breaching the duty of loyalty in order for demand to be excused. Ultimately, Plaintiff failed to do that.
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a minority stockholder of AbbVie, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. Shire was an Island of Jersey biopharmaceutical company with its headquarters in Dublin, Ireland.
By Scott Waxman and Adrienne Wimberly
In Mesirov v. Enbridge Company, Inc., et al. C.A. No. 11314-VCS (Del. Ch. Aug.29, 2018), the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed five of eight counts alleged with respect to a transaction where Enbridge Energy Company (EEP) repurchased for $1 billion a two-thirds interest in Alberta Clipper Pipelines (AC interest), despite the fact that EEP had sold that same interest years prior for $800 million and the business had steadily declined since such sale. The dismissals were based primarily upon the language and obligations included in EEP’s limited partnership agreement.
In a landmark decision, a Delaware court has, for what is widely believed to be the first time ever, found that a material adverse effect actually occurred in an acquisition transaction, giving the buyer a right to terminate the pending transaction. In Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) held, following a trial, that the buyer properly terminated the parties’ merger agreement, due to such a material adverse effect between signing and closing, under the terms of the agreement and the pertinent Delaware case law. Unlike prior decisions rejecting buyer material adverse effect claims, the Court found that a pre-closing decline in the business of the target – Akorn – was not merely a “cyclical trend” and was likely to have a post-closing, durationally-significant effect that was “material when viewed from the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror.” Although groundbreaking, the Akorn decision reflects that the Delaware courts will still approach the question of whether an MAE has occurred on a case-by-case basis and does not establish a particular “bright line” test.
In Jennifer L. Stritzinger v. Dennis Barba, et al. Civil Action No. 12776-CB, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Stritzinger’s derivative lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty for alleged mismanagement of Newark Country Club (the “Club”), a private corporation located in Newark, Delaware. The Court dismissed Stritzinger’s suit finding Stritzinger failed to establish demand futility before filing suit against the Club.
Only a handful of the claims survived summary judgment in the recent order issued by Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III in In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litig. This was the third major ruling in a five-year-old, repeatedly amended stockholder suit that involved stock incentives, a past acquisition bonus, and allegedly inadequate disclosures. Of the ten causes of action, the only ones to survive summary judgment were claims for breach of fiduciary duty to disclose material facts that alleged false or misleading disclosures that could have altered deliberations of a reasonable shareholder.
The surviving disputes, which are now headed to trial, concerns three documents that created executive compensation arrangements in 2009 and 2010: (1) an Acquisition Bonus Agreement (“ABA”) that Ebix, Inc. (“Ebix”) entered into with Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Robin Raina in 2009; (2) a 2010 Stock Incentive Plan (the “2010 Plan”), (3) a proxy statement issued before Ebix’s 2010 annual meeting (the “2010 Proxy Statement”) in which Ebix’s board of directors (“Board”) recommended approval of the 2010 Plan, and (4) the proxy statement issued in 2016 that included the 2016 CEO bonus plan (the “2016 Proxy Statement”). Read More