In MHS Capital LLC v. Goggin, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the manager of a Delaware limited liability company because all of the manager’s conduct that could have formed the basis of such claim was covered by the duties of the manager delineated in the limited liability company agreement. The Court also analyzed and dismissed claims for, among other things, fraud, breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and misappropriation of trade secrets.
In Carr v. New Enterprise Associates, Inc., C.A. No. 20170381-AGB (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery, in denying in part and granting in part a motion to dismiss, reaffirmed the principle that a controlling stockholder, when acting outside its capacity as a stockholder, cannot use the corporation to advance the controlling stockholder’s self-interest at the expense of minority stockholders. In the context of defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court found that it was reasonably conceivable that the controlling stockholder of American Cardiac Therapeutics, Inc. (“ACT”) and its conflicted board of directors had breached their duty of loyalty to ACT’s minority stockholders by approving a sale of a warrant to a third party that included an option to acquire ACT, allegedly at an unfairly low price, in order to incentivize the third party to also acquire and invest in the controlling stockholder’s other portfolio companies.
In In Re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss an action brought by plaintiffs (Tesla stockholders) against nominal Defendant Tesla Motors in connection with Tesla’s acquisition of SolarCity Corporation. Plaintiffs alleged that Tesla’s board of directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving the acquisition of SolarCity, which benefitted SolarCity stakeholders but negatively affected Tesla stockholders. SolarCity is a public Delaware corporation founded by Elon Musk and his cousins, Peter and Lyndon Rive. Musk and his cousins sit on the SolarCity Board. Lyndon was SolarCity’s CEO and Peter was its CTO.
In Richard B. Gamberg 2007 Family Trust v. United Restaurant Group, L.P., C.A. No. 10994-VCMR (Del. Ch. January 26, 2018), the Court of Chancery held that limited partner, Richard B. Gamberg 2007 Family Trust (the “Plaintiff”), failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to various claims against United Restaurant Group L.P. (the “Partnership”), Atlantic Coast Dining, Inc. (the “General Partner”), and the directors/shareholders of the General Partner (the “Shareholder Defendants”; together with the Partnership and the General Partner, the “Defendants”), which included a mistake-based reformation claim, among other breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims.
In Kevin Capone and Steven Scheinman v. LDH Management Holdings LLC, et al., C.A. No. 11687-VCG (Del. Ch. April 25, 2018), the plaintiffs, Kevin Capone (“Capone”) and Steven Scheinman (“Scheinman”), and the defendants, LDH Management Holdings LLC (“Management Holdings”), LDHMH MM, LLC (together with Management Holdings, the “LLCs”), Castleton Commodities International LLC (f/k/a Louis Dreyfus Highbridge Energy LLC (“LDH”)) and certain members of the Board of Directors of LDH, each moved for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants violated Delaware law by cancelling the LLCs without setting aside a reserve for the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and held that the defendants were aware of the plaintiffs’ non-frivolous claims for breach of contract against the LLCs and, therefore, the defendants acted in violation of Delaware law when they failed to create a reserve to cover the plaintiffs’ claims when the LLCs were dissolved.
In KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Technologies, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0177-JRS (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2018), in a post-trial ruling, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a stockholder limited rights to inspect a corporation’s books and records related to the stated purpose of investigating possible wrongdoing, but the Court denied the stockholder’s request to obtain other books and records related to the purpose of valuing its shares because its initial demand did not explicitly state a valuation purpose.
In In re Rouse Properties, Inc. Fiduciary Litigation, C.A. No. 12194-VCS, the George Leon Family Trust and Dr. Robert A Corwin (the “Plaintiffs”) sought to recover damages on behalf of Rouse Properties Inc. (“Rouse”) stockholders, for breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties against Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (“Brookfield”) and five Rouse directors individually arising out of a July 2016 merger between two mall real estate holding companies (the “Merger”). The court dismissed all claims finding that Brookfield was not a minority controlling stockholder of Rouse and did not wield undue influence over the board of directors of Rouse in general or during Merger discussions and that the Plaintiffs failed to well plead that the stockholder vote approving the Merger was uninformed or coerced.
In In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. Section 220 Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 2017-0681-TMR (Ch. Ct February 28, 2018) certain stockholders (“Plaintiffs”) of UnitedHealth Group, Inc. (“UnitedHealth”) sent a books and records inspection demand to UnitedHealth relying on a complaint in a type of whistleblower (qui tam) action alleging that UnitedHealth engaged in improper Medicare billing, United States ex rel. Poehling v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. (the “Qui Tam Action”). The Qui Tam Action was based in part on a 5-year investigation by the US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and included depositions of 20 of UnitedHealth’s employees and production by UnitedHealth of over 600,000 documents. Plaintiffs made their demand in order to investigate mismanagement or misconduct, possible breaches of fiduciary duties and the independence and disinterestedness of the board. UnitedHealth rejected the demand and a trial was held on January 9, 2018. UnitedHealth argued that Plaintiffs were not entitled to inspection of books and records because they lacked a credible basis to infer wrongdoing or mismanagement based on the Qui Tam Action and because the alleged activities of UnitedHealth were not illegal. The Court found that Plaintiffs’ demand stated a proper purpose and a credible basis from which a court could infer mismanagement or wrongdoing.
Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, et al. came before the Delaware Court of Chancery as a dispute over a merger between Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (“ETP”) and Regency Energy Partners LP (“Regency”) for an exchange ratio of 0.4066 and a cash payment of $0.32 per common unit of Regency (the “Merger”).
In Cumming v. Edens, et al., C.A. No. 13007-VCS (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2018), the Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a derivative suit for breach of fiduciary duties brought by a stockholder of New Senior Investment Group, Inc. (“New Senior”) against New Senior’s board of directors (the “Board”) and related parties in connection with New Senior’s $640 million acquisition of Holiday Acquisition Holdings LLC (“Holiday”). The Court made clear that compliance with Section 144 does not necessarily provide a safe harbor against claims for breach of fiduciary duty and invoke business judgment review of an interested transaction. Because the complaint alleged with specificity “that the Board acted out of self-interest or with allegiance to interest other than the stockholders,” the court applied the entire fairness standard of review and concluded that the transaction was not fair to New Senior stockholders. Read More
In Benjamin Feldman v. YIDL Trust, C.A. No. 2017-0253-AGB (Del. Ch. November 7, 2017), plaintiff Benjamin Feldman brought a motion for summary judgment under Court of Chancery Rule 56 for dissolution of a jointly-held Delaware corporation pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 273. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that YIDL Trust made voluntary and knowing concessions of fact during the judicial proceedings that conclusively established the prerequisites for a judicial order of dissolution under Section 273.
In Wilkin v. Narachi, et al., and Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., Civil Action No. 12412-VCMR (Del. Ch. February 28, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss brought by defendants (“Defendants”), directors and officers of biopharmaceutical company Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc. (“Orexigen”), for failure to plead demand futility under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. The Court ruled that the plaintiff, a stockholder of Orexigen (“Plaintiff”), did not plead sufficient facts to show that a substantial likelihood of liability prevented the directors from exercising independent and disinterested business judgment when considering a demand to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation.