In CBS Corporation, et al. v. National Amusements, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 2018-0342-AGB, the Court of Chancery denied a motion for temporary retraining order brought by CBS Corporation (“CBS”) and five independent directors of CBS (the “Plaintiffs”) to restrain controlling shareholders, Shari Redstone, her father Sumner Redstone, National Amusements, Inc. (“NAI”), NAI Entertainment Holdings LLC, and the Sumner M. Redstone National Amusements Trust (the “Defendants”) from taking certain actions that would interfere with the governance of CBS or other proposed actions of the board of directors of CBS. The Court found that there was no precedent for the type of relief requested by Plaintiff and that no extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant the grant of such relief. Read More
In Pell v. Kill, et al, C.A. No. 12251-VCL (Del. Ch. May, 19, 2016), Vice Chancellor Laster preliminarily enjoined incumbent members of a board of directors from implementing a plan to reduce the number of board seats prior to a directors’ election at an annual meeting after a proxy challenge had been made.
In Gorman, IV v. Salamone, Halder and Westech Capital Corp. (“Westech”), the Delaware Chancery Court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, issued another status quo order to temporarily fix the composition of the board of Westech while the ongoing dispute over control of Westech played out.
Plaintiff John Gorman (“Gorman”) a Westech stockholder and board member brought the Section 225 action based on two developments while a prior Section 225 temporarily designating three directors and keeping the CEO was on appeal before the Delaware Supreme Court.
In Partners Healthcare Solutions Holdings, L.P. and GTCR Fund IX/A, L.P. v. Universal American Corp., Partners Healthcare Solutions Holdings, L.P. (“Partners”) sued Universal American Corporation (“UAM”), seeking damages and specific performance following a dispute as to Partners’ appointment of a director to UAM’s board. During the litigation, the parties reached a settlement as to the specific performance aspect of the litigation, leaving only the issues of damages. UAM filed a motion for summary judgment, which Vice Chancellor Glasscock granted.
In March 2012, Partners entered into a merger agreement with UAM, pursuant to which UAM purchased a Partners subsidiary, and Partners became one of UAM’s largest stockholders. Partners was also given a seat for its designee on UAM’s board pursuant to a letter agreement (“Board Seat Agreement”). That agreement provided that the designee must be independent under stock exchange rules, and granted Partners the right to name a replacement in the event that the initial designee resigned. Partners named David Katz, a former board member of Partners, to the UAM board.
On November 7, 2014, Chancellor Bouchard denied the plaintiffs’ requests for summary judgment in In re: Allergan, Inc. Stockholder Litigation. This ruling comes amid an acrimonious proxy fight in which a company owned by Valeant and Pershing Square are seeking to remove six of the nine members of the Allergan Board and request that the Board engage in good faith discussions with Valeant with regard to a Valeant proposal to merge with Allergan that will come to a head at a special stockholder meeting scheduled for December 18, 2014.
The charter and bylaw provisions challenged by the plaintiffs permitted holders of 25% of Allergan’s stock to call a special meeting or act by stockholder consent, but not with regard to any matter that is identical or substantially similar to one presented at a stockholder meeting held during the previous year (a so-called “Similar Items” provision). In a Supplemental Proxy Statement, Allergan had stated that this would permit stockholders to remove directors, but not to replace them by written consent at a meeting called by stockholders if an election had occurred within the past year. The plaintiffs asked for a declaratory judgment that the Similar Items provisions would not prevent the stockholders from, at a special meeting, both removing the entire Board and electing a new Board so long as the new directors had not been up for election during the preceding year.
In Gassis v. Corkery, Civil Action No. 8868, Bishop Macram Max Gassis challenged his removal as Chairman of the Board and as a director of the Bishop Gassis Sudan Relief Fund, Inc., a Delaware charitable nonstock corporation (the “Fund”) dedicated to helping the people of southern Sudan. The Bishop also challenged the previous removal of two directors from the Fund’s board and the elections of two directors who replaced them.
Bishop Gassis’ removal at a 2013 board meeting came after years of friction with other board members, who contended that the Bishop was difficult to work with, negatively interacted with the Fund’s beneficiaries in Sudan, spent extravagantly on travels, invested in suspicious projects, and acted as though he had a personal interest in the Fund’s assets. These board members further argued that a provision of the Fund’s bylaws providing that the Bishop “shall serve [as Chairman of the Board] until his retirement or resignation” required him to be removed from the board upon his retirement as a Catholic Bishop, which was to occur on his seventy-fifth birthday on September 21, 2013.
In his May 21, 2014 opinion in Oracle Partners, L.P. v. Biolase, Inc., C.A. No. 9438-VCN (Del. Ch. May 21, 2014), Vice Chancellor Noble addressed the issue of what was said, and the legal effect of the statements made, during a telephonic meeting (the “Meeting”) of the board of directors of Biolase, Inc. (“Biolase”) on Friday, February 28, 2014.
Prior to the Meeting, Biolase had six directors. On the Monday following the meeting, Biolase issued a press release stating that two of the directors — Alexander Arrow, M.D. (“Arrow”) and Samuel Low, D.D.S. (“Low”) — had resigned from the board and two new directors — Paul Clark (“Clark”) and Jeffrey Nugent (“Nugent”) — had been appointed in their place. In a contradictory Form 8-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) three days later, which included the press release as an exhibit, the Company disclosed only that Clark and Nugent had been appointed to the board, which had apparently increased to eight members.