In ChyronHego Corporation, et al., v. Cliff Wight and CFX Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0548-SG (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim for extra-contractual fraud on the basis that the stock purchase agreement contained an effective anti-reliance clause that precluded such claim. The Court found that the anti-reliance clause rebutted the common law fraud element of reliance on any extra-contractual representations, as described further below. At the same time, the Court dismissed the defendants’ motion to dismiss claims for fraud and breaches of express representations and warranties under the stock purchase agreement, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded the elements of these claims.
In MHS Capital LLC v. Goggin, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the manager of a Delaware limited liability company because all of the manager’s conduct that could have formed the basis of such claim was covered by the duties of the manager delineated in the limited liability company agreement. The Court also analyzed and dismissed claims for, among other things, fraud, breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and misappropriation of trade secrets.
In Sparton Corporation v. Joseph F. O’Neil et al., Civil Action No. 12403-VCMR (Del. Ch. August 9, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety because the plaintiff failed to state a claim for fraud and breach of contract. Seeking extra-contractual relief from a merger agreement, the plaintiff-buyer claimed, among other losses, $1.8 million in damages caused by the sellers’ misrepresentation of the target company’s working capital. The plaintiff argued that the defendant-sellers’ alleged extra-contractual misrepresentations warranted judicial intervention despite express anti-reliance and exclusive remedy provisions in the merger agreement.
By Scott E. Waxman and Russell E. Deutsch
In In re Massey Energy Company Derivative And Class Action Litigation, C.A. No. 5430-CB (Del. Ch. May 4, 2017), the Chancery Court dismissed both the direct class action claim for “inseparable fraud” and the derivative claim brought by the former shareholders of Massey Energy (“Massey” or the “Corporation”) against the former directors and officers of Massey for breaching their fiduciary duties by causing Massey to operate in willful disregard of safety regulations. The court dismissed the derivative claim holding that the plaintiffs were not continuous shareholders, and therefore lacked standing to bring a derivative claim after Massey merged into Alpha Natural Resources, Inc. (Alpha) in June of 2011. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ direct claim for “inseparable fraud” claim holding that, though pled as a direct claim, it was, in fact, also a derivative claim that the plaintiffs’ lacked the standing to maintain.
In LVI Group Investments, LLC v. NCM Group Holdings, LLC, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware looked to Delaware corporate law for demand futility pleading requirements in dismissing a derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duties against managers of a Delaware limited liability company (an “LLC”). In addition, the Court of Chancery analyzed the requirements for a member of an LLC sufficiently to plead a direct claim against managers of the LLC and analyzed the requirements for pleading a claim of fraud.
In IAC Search, LLC, v. Conversant LLC (f/k/a ValueClick, Inc.), C.A. No. 11774-CB (Del. Ch. Ct. November 30, 2016) the Chancery Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fraud claim based on the inclusion of provisions in the purchase agreement that disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual statements that bar plaintiff’s fraud claim. The Court also granted defendant’s motion to dismiss one breach of contract claim, but denied the motion with respect to several other breach of contract claims.
In a mixed ruling, the Chancery Court denied, in part, baseball legend Derek Jeter’s motion to dismiss claims that he breached his fiduciary duty as a director of undergarment manufacturer RevolutionWear, that he violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that he fraudulently induced a contract with RevolutionWear and fraudulently concealed restrictions in his endorsement contract with Nike that precluded Jeter from fulfilling his promise to allow RevolutionWear to announce his role as a founder, substantial owner, and director.
In FdG Logistics v. A&R Logistics, C.A. No. 9706-CB (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2016), the Court of Chancery held that a non-reliance provision contained in a merger agreement was ineffective to bar a buyer’s fraud claims based on extra-contractual statements made during the due diligence and negotiation process because the non-reliance provision was formulated solely as a limitation on the seller’s representations and warranties. According to the Court, for a non-reliance provision to be effective against a buyer, it must be formulated as an affirmative promise by the buyer that it did not rely on any extra-contractual statements made by the seller during the sales process. The decision clarifies the Court of Chancery’s 2015 decision in Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Holding Corp., C.A. No. 10127-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2015) in which the Court emphasized that “no magic words” are required for a non-reliance provision to be effective.
By Eric Feldman and James Parks
On a motion to dismiss in Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Holding Corp., the Delaware Court of Chancery, granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion, re-enforced the importance of bargained-for contractual terms in the context of a dispute over a transaction consummated pursuant to a stock purchase agreement.
The case involves a transaction between two private equity firms, Prairie Capital Partners and Incline Equity Partners. Prairie Capital Partners, through its sponsored funds Prairie Capital III, L.P and Prairie Capital III QP, L.P. (collectively, “Prairie Capital”), owned Double E Parent LLC (the “Company”), a portfolio company, which it sold to Double E Holding Corp., which was an acquisition vehicle formed by Incline Equity Partners III, L.P., which was sponsored by Incline Equity Partners (collectively the “Buyer”). Prairie Capital III L.P. and Prairie Capital III QP, L.P. (the “Sellers”) were the principal sellers, and the Stock Purchase Agreement (the “SPA”) was signed and the transaction closed on April 4, 2012. The SPA established an escrow fund for a limited period of time for the parties’ respective indemnification obligations and included procedures to make a claim against such escrow fund.
In Black Horse Capital, LP, et al. v. Xstelos Holdings, Inc., et al., the plaintiffs, including Cheval Holdings, Ltd. (“Cheval Holdings”), Black Horse Capital, LP, Black Horse Capital Master Fund Ltd. (together with Black Horse Capital, LP, “Black Horse”), and Ouray Holdings I AG, filed a breach of contract action arising out of a transaction in which the plaintiffs and defendants, Jonathan M. Couchman, Xstelos Holdings, Inc., and Xstelos Corp. (formerly known as Footstar Inc. and Footstar Corp. (“Footstar”)) jointly acquired a pharmaceuticals company, CPEX Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“CPEX”), which is now wholly owned by defendant FCB I Holdings, Inc. (“FCB Holdings”), an entity jointly owned by Footstar and Cheval Holdings. Immediately following the closing of the acquisition, FCB Holdings was owned 80.5% by Footstar and 19.5% by Cheval Holdings.
The plaintiffs’ claims arose out of an alleged oral promise in December 2010 by the defendants to transfer to the plaintiffs certain assets of CPEX, specifically an additional 60% ownership interest in the drug product known as SER-120 and referred to as “Serenity” by the court. The transfer was to occur after the closing of the CPEX acquisition in exchange for the plaintiffs funding a disproportionately large bridge loan to FCB Holdings (the “Serenity Agreement”). On January 3, 2011, each of Black Horse and Footstar entered into separate bridge loan commitment letters with FCB Holdings and CPEX in the amounts of $10 million and $3 million, respectively. In April 2011, the bridge loans were made to FCB Holdings and the CPEX acquisition closed. In connection with the CPEX acquisition, the bridge loans, and the other related transactions, the parties entered into customary transaction documents. Although the alleged oral promise of the Serenity Agreement was made prior to the parties entering into the transaction documents, none of the transaction documents executed in connection with the loan or the merger referenced the Serenity Agreement. Furthermore, the transaction documents also contained customary integration clauses. By December 2012, the transfer of assets contemplated by the Serenity Agreement had not occurred and relations between the parties deteriorated to the point where the plaintiffs filed this action in June 2013.
This final report stems from plaintiff-shareholder Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System’s (“Oklahoma Firefighters” or “Plaintiff”) demand under 8 Del. C. §220 for access to defendant Citigroup Inc.’s (“Citigroup” or “Defendant”) books and records in connection with alleged fraud and money laundering at two Citigroup subsidiaries. Following a paper record trial in June 2014, the court concluded in its draft report that Plaintiff had a proper purpose in seeking access to the books and records, but the court narrowed the scope of Plaintiff’s initial request. At the present phase of the case, Citigroup objects to the conclusions reached in the draft report, arguing that the incidents at the subsidiaries do not give Plaintiff a credible basis from which to infer wrongdoing or mismanagement on the part of the Citigroup Board of Directors. Moreover, Citigroup contends that even if Plaintiff’s purpose were proper, the scope of the documents requested is still too broad.
The demand arises from incidents at Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A. (“Banamex”) and Banamex USA, which together account for 10% of the global profits of Citigroup. At Banamex, a fraudulent accounts receivables finance arrangement was discovered, which caused Citigroup to adjust downward its 2013 fourth quarter and full year financials by $235 million. Investigations into the fraud indicated that Citigroup may not have had the proper internal controls in place to prevent fraud, and Moody’s subsequently downgraded Banamex’s debt and deposit ratings due to the allegations surrounding the bank. Another smaller fraud of $30 million was also uncovered at Banamex. At Banamex USA, grand jury subpoenas were issued by the United States District Attorney for the District of Massachusetts regarding compliance with Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) regulations. The grand jury subpoenas were issued subsequent to a number of consent orders between Citigroup and various financial regulatory agencies regarding insufficient BSA and AML controls, risk management, the flow of drug cartel-related funds, and general oversight. In response to the BSA and AML concerns, the Citigroup Board of Directors charged the Board’s Audit Committee with responsibility for legal compliance oversight.
In re Nine Systems Corp. S’Holders Litig. involves the 2002 recapitalization of a two-year-old start-up company, Streaming Media Corporation, later known as Nine Systems Corporation (the “Corporation”). The Corporation was going to have to liquidate unless it could carry out two acquisitions, and the purpose of the 2002 recapitalization was to fund these acquisitions. The recapitalization was approved by four of the directors of the Board of the Corporation, one the CEO of the Corporation and the other three employees of three private equity funds, two of which provided the financing needed for the acquisitions through the recapitalization, and the third of which was given a 90-day option to participate in the recapitalization but did not do so. The fifth director, whose firm had brought in minority stockholders, was not kept informed regarding the recapitalization, which was highly dilutive to the minority stockholders, and never fully approved it. The terms of the recapitalization were proposed by the director whose firm was the largest participant in the recapitalization based on his estimate that the Corporation was worth $4 million, without any independent valuation of the Corporation. After the acquisitions, the Corporation became successful, and it was sold four years later for $175 million.