In Simon Ogus v. SportTechie, Inc., memorandum opinion 200131, C.A. No. 2018-0869-AGB, the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”), generally held that Simon Ogus (the “Plaintiff”), pled sufficiently claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, civil conspiracy and breach of contract against Oak View Group, LLC (“Oak View”) and individuals Taylor Bloom, Francesca Bodie, Daniel Kaufman (each a “Defendant” and together the “Defendants”). The claims stemmed from the Plaintiff’s termination and subsequent forced sale of shares in SportTechie, Inc. (“SportTechie or the “Company”), and the Court allowed most of the Plaintiff’s claims to survive the 12(b)(6) motion but dismissed a small number as well.Read More
In PWP Xerion Holdings III LLC v. Red Leaf Resources Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0235-JTL (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) granted Xerion Holdings III LLC’s (“Xerion”) motion for partial summary judgement on a breach of contract claim, holding that the Red Leaf Resources, Inc. (“Red Leaf” or the “Company”) breached Xerion’s contractual right to consent as the holder of a majority of the shares of the Company’s Series A preferred stock.Read More
In Western Standard, LLC, v. SourceHOV Holdings, Inc. and Pangea Acquisitions, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0280-JRS (Del. Ch. July 24, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) refused to the grant SourceHOV Holdings, Inc. (“SourceHOV”) and Pangea Acquisitions, Inc.’s (“Pangea”) motion to dismiss, holding that more extrinsic evidence was needed for the Court to be able to interpret the terms of the merger agreement (the “Merger Agreement”) among Pangea and BancTec, Inc. (“BancTec”) and decide whether there was a valid breach of a contract claim.Read More
In Fortis Advisors LLC v. Stora Enso AB letter opinion 180810, Stora Enso AB (the “Defendant”) filed a motion to dismiss the claims by Fortis Advisors LLC (the “Plaintiff”), alleging the merger agreement (the “Merger Agreement”) entered into by each of the parties unambiguously did not obligate the Defendant to make further payments to the Plaintiff. The Chancery Court disagreed, finding the language of the Merger Agreement ambiguous, therefore denying the Defendant’s motion.Read More
In QC Holdings, Inc. v. Allconnect, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0715-JTL (Del. Ch. August 28, 2018), plaintiff QC Holdings, Inc. (“QC Holdings”), a former stockholder of defendant Allconnect, Inc. (the “Company”), brought a claim against the Company to enforce its right (the “Put Right”) under a Put Agreement to sell its Company shares (the “Put Shares”) to the Company in exchange for $5 million (the “Put Price”). The Company had refused to pay the Put Price on the basis that it was contractually restricted from doing so on the date required under the Put Agreement, and therefore the Put Right was extinguished and never survived a subsequent merger of the Company when those restrictions arguably lifted. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the Company’s arguments would have resulted in an improper forfeiture of QC Holdings’ contractual rights to the Put Price and that the exercise of the Put Right constituted a redemption of the Put Shares prior to the merger and a continuing contractual obligation by the Company to pay the Put Price. The Court ordered the Company to pay the Put Price to QC Holdings out of an escrow set up at the merger closing for this purpose.
In ChyronHego Corporation, et al., v. Cliff Wight and CFX Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0548-SG (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim for extra-contractual fraud on the basis that the stock purchase agreement contained an effective anti-reliance clause that precluded such claim. The Court found that the anti-reliance clause rebutted the common law fraud element of reliance on any extra-contractual representations, as described further below. At the same time, the Court dismissed the defendants’ motion to dismiss claims for fraud and breaches of express representations and warranties under the stock purchase agreement, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded the elements of these claims.
In Richard B. Gamberg 2007 Family Trust v. United Restaurant Group, L.P., C.A. No. 10994-VCMR (Del. Ch. January 26, 2018), the Court of Chancery held that limited partner, Richard B. Gamberg 2007 Family Trust (the “Plaintiff”), failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to various claims against United Restaurant Group L.P. (the “Partnership”), Atlantic Coast Dining, Inc. (the “General Partner”), and the directors/shareholders of the General Partner (the “Shareholder Defendants”; together with the Partnership and the General Partner, the “Defendants”), which included a mistake-based reformation claim, among other breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims.
By order dated August 4, 2017, Vice Chancellor Slights dismissed the complaint seeking to enforce non-compete and non-solicitation provisions in a stockholders’ agreement in EBP Lifestyle Brands Holdings, Inc. v. Boulbain, C.A. No. 2017-0269-JRS (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2017), finding that the Delaware Chancery Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Specifically, the Court held that defendant’s execution of a stockholders’ agreement governed by Delaware law and concerning a Delaware corporation was insufficient to satisfy the statutory and constitutional requirements to establish personal jurisdiction over an individual not resident or transacting business in Delaware.
In AM General Holdings LLC v. The Renco Group, Inc., C.A. No. 7639-VCS and The Renco Group, Inc. v. MacAndrews AMG Holdings LLC, C.A. No. 7668-VCS (Del. Ch. May 17, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied cross-motions for partial summary judgment after reviewing the LLC Agreement of AM General Holdings LLC, which governs the joint venture relationship between Plaintiff, The Renco Group, Inc. (“Renco”), and Defendant, MacAndrews AMG Holdings LLC (“MacAndrews”), both members of AM General Holdings LLC (the “Company”). Renco brought suit against MacAndrews alleging that MacAndrews, the managing member of the Company, caused the Company to distribute $72.8 million to MacAndrews in breach of the Company’s LLC Agreement. Renco contended that, according to the LLC Agreement, the $72.8 million should have been distributed to Renco instead. Both parties pointed to several provisions of the LLC Agreement governing the distribution at issue, and both parties contended that these provisions were clear and unambiguous. After reviewing the provisions, however, the Court determined that the provisions were, in fact, ambiguous and thus, the case could not be disposed of through summary judgment proceedings.
In IAC Search, LLC, v. Conversant LLC (f/k/a ValueClick, Inc.), C.A. No. 11774-CB (Del. Ch. Ct. November 30, 2016) the Chancery Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fraud claim based on the inclusion of provisions in the purchase agreement that disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual statements that bar plaintiff’s fraud claim. The Court also granted defendant’s motion to dismiss one breach of contract claim, but denied the motion with respect to several other breach of contract claims.
In Cyber Holding LLC v. CyberCore Holding, Inc. (C.A. No. 7369-VCN), the Delaware Court of Chancery (Noble, J.) ruled on a contract dispute over which party is entitled to tax savings in the amount of $1,557,171, resulting from deductions of various transaction expenses during the stub year. In its opinion, the Court reached its conclusion by applying the objective theory of contract construction combined with the consideration of extrinsic evidence in an effort “to ascertain the shared intentions of the parties.” After considering the limited extrinsic evidence available and conducting its analysis of the Agreement, the Court ruled in favor of the seller and held that the Buyer would have to remit the tax savings plus post-judgment interest. The Court rejected the seller’s request for prejudgment interest as the Agreement’s exclusive remedy provision controlled over the default of awarding prejudgment interest.