CSH Theatres, LLC v. Nederlander of San Francisco Associates, CA No. 9830-VCMR (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018) concerns the dramatic break-up of a prominent theater company partnership in San Francisco involving claims and counterclaims alleging violations of contractual and fiduciary duties and charges of self-dealing and bad faith conduct. The Delaware Court of Chancery found that no enforceable contract to renew the lease to San Francisco’s Curran Theater existed but the Court did grant the theater operator a declaratory judgment that the principals of the owner had breached their common law fiduciary duties while they were also serving as managers of the theater operator.
In Trascent Management Consulting, LLC v. George Bouri, C.A. No. 10915-VCMR (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2018), the Court of Chancery declared a limited liability company agreement unenforceable and rescinded a related employment agreement with the defendant, George Bouri, due to Bouri’s fraudulent and false statements that induced the plaintiff’s principal, Rakesh Kishan, to form Trascent Management Consulting, LLC (“Trascent”), and for Kishan and Trascent to enter into the LLC agreement and the employment agreement with Bouri. In addition, the Court awarded certain attorneys’ fees and costs to Trascent as sanctions for defendant’s continued fraudulent and false statements during the litigation proceedings. Read More
In A&J Capital, Inc. v. Law Office of Krug, C.A. No. 2018-0240-JRS (July 18, 2018), A&J Capital, Inc. (“A&J”) sought a declaratory judgment that it was improperly removed from its position as manager of LA Metropolis Condo, I LLC (the “Company”) because it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to removal. Vice Chancellor Slights denied A&J’s motion for summary judgment, holding that A&J’s removal was proper under both the Company’s governing documents and common law.
In MHS Capital LLC v. Goggin, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the manager of a Delaware limited liability company because all of the manager’s conduct that could have formed the basis of such claim was covered by the duties of the manager delineated in the limited liability company agreement. The Court also analyzed and dismissed claims for, among other things, fraud, breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and misappropriation of trade secrets.
In In re GR BURGR, LLC, C.A. No. 12825-VCS (Aug. 25, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery exercised its power under Section 18-802 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act to effect the judicial dissolution of GR BURGR, LLC (“GRB”). GRB was a Delaware limited liability company formed by an entity affiliated with celebrity chef Gordon Ramsay (“GRUS”) and Rowan Siebel, each owning a 50% membership interest. This structure, along with the LLC Agreement’s lack of a tiebreaker, effectively turned any action requiring a majority vote of the managers into a unanimous vote. The relationship between the members eventually deteriorated, and the company, formed for the purpose of developing and operating burger restaurants, became locked in a stalemate regarding its future operations. GRUS petitioned for dissolution Section 18-802. The Court found that the undisputed facts entitled GRUS to such relief and, rejecting Siebel’s claims that dissolution was not equitable, granted the same.
In Terramar Retail Centers, LLC v. Marion #2-Seaport Trust U/A/D/ June 21, 2002, Civil Action No. 12875-VCL (Del. Ch. August 18, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied an out-of-state defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that defendant’s trustor was actively involved in negotiating both the underlying business deal and the terms of the operating agreement of the Delaware limited liability company at issue. Read More
In Simon-Mills II, LLC, et al., v. KanAm USA XVI Limited Partnership, et al., C.A. No. 8520-VCG (Del. Ch. March 30, 2017), the Court of Chancery denied Plaintiffs’ request to enforce its call right and granted Defendants’ request for declaratory judgment when the contracted consideration for the call right could not be tendered.
In Dietrichson v. Knott, C.A. No. 11965-VCMR (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2017), the Chancery Court dismissed the entire complaint brought by one member of a limited liability company against another member for paying himself an unauthorized salary and misappropriating the proceeds of a sale of the company’s assets, concluding that the claims made were derivative rather than direct stockholder claims. The Court also held that plaintiff’s claims were not “dual-natured” (i.e., having both direct and derivative aspects), because the plaintiff failed to plead that the transaction resulted in both an improper transfer of economic value and voting power from the minority equity holders to the controlling equity holder.
In Ensing v. Ensing, C.A. No. 12591-VCS (March. 6, 2017), Vice Chancellor Slights entered declaratory judgments in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the defendant’s actions were null and void as a matter of law. A husband and wife, Dr. Hans Ensing (“Hans”) and Sara Ensing (“Sara”) own and operate a winery and boutique hotel in Italy. The businesses operate indirectly through two Delaware limited liability companies. Prior to the events leading up to this litigation, Sara was a manager and member of one of the entities and, through that entity, was manager of the other. Hans was neither a member nor manager of either entity. When Hans purported to remove Sara and appoint himself as manager of one of the two entities and then engaged in a series of transactions to divest Sara of her interests in the winery and hotel, Sara initiated this action.
In Bennett J. Glazer, et al. v. Alliance Beverage Distributing Co., LLC, Civil Action No. 12647-VCMR (Del. Ch. Ct. March 2, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendant’s motion to stay, holding that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the question of substantive arbitrability when the disputing parties are bound by an LLC agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.
In CelestialRX Investments, LLC and Krittika Life Sciences, LLC v. Krivulka, et al., C.A. No. 11733-VCG (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed two preliminary issues before it on motions for partial summary judgment filed by the various defendants. The plaintiffs include CelestialRX Investments, LLC (“CelestialRX”), one of three members of the Delaware limited liability company Akrimax Pharmaceuticals, LLC (“Akrimax”). The defendants include Leonard Mazur and Joseph J. Krivulka (“Krivulka”), the two other members of Akrimax, along with various entities Krivulka controls or in which he has invested. These entities entered into a number of transactions with Akrimax, these transactions being at the heart of this dispute. The Court first considered whether a release agreement dated July 1, 2013 (“Release Agreement”) barred CelestialRX from bringing causes of actions against the defendants which occurred prior to the release. After applying rules of contract interpretation, the Court, in dismissing the motion for partial summary judgment, held that the plaintiff was not a “Releasing Party” as defined in the Release Agreement and thus had not released any claims existing as of July 1, 2013. The Court next considered the extent to which the LLC Agreement of Akrimax and its July 1, 2013 amendment (“Amendment No. 7”) limited or modified fiduciary duties of the members, directors or managers of Akrimax, and what standard of care applied under the LLC Agreement in the context of conflicted transactions.
In Grand Acquisition LLC v. Passco Indian Springs DST, C.A. No. 12003-VCMR (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2016) the Delaware Court of Chancery found that under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (the “Act”), the governing instrument of a Delaware statutory trust (DST) does not need to affirmatively disavow the preconditions and defenses applicable to inspection rights related to a DST’s books and records under Section 3819 of the Act in order to create a separate and distinct contractual right that can, in some circumstances, render statutory preconditions and defenses inapplicable to such requests. Read More