In Nielsen v. EBTH Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0164-MTZ (Del. Ch. Sep. 30, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed its standard favoring advancement of expenses to officers or directors of a company where the corporation provides mandatory advancement rights either by its certificate of incorporation (“Charter”) or separate indemnification agreements. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs because they (i) either used their corporate powers or such powers were necessary for the commission of the alleged misconduct in the underlying action; or (ii) the alleged misconduct in the underlying action is inextricably intertwined with the actions taken in the plaintiffs’ former capacities as officers or directors, such that the plaintiffs would necessarily be required to disprove allegations that they acted improperly as such. Advancement is appropriate when either of the two prongs for this nexus test are met.Read More
In Computer Science Corporation v. Eric Pulier, et al., C.A. No. 11011-CB (Del. Ch. June 27, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff Computer Sciences Corporation’s (“CSC”) motion for partial summary judgement seeking to recover a portion of funds advanced to a former officer of ServiceMesh, Inc. (an entity CSC had acquired) for legal expenses incurred in defending a separate action. The Court held that based on its interpretation of the plain language of the indemnification provision in the relevant acquisition agreement that the indemnification provision was not broad enough to encompass the advancement of legal expenses in question.Read More
In Ephrat v. medCPU, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0852-MTZ (Del. Ch. June 26, 2019), the Court of Chancery found that conduct occurring after Eyal Ephrat and Sonia Ben-Yehuda (together, “Petitioners”) left their positions warrants advancement provided that such conduct was related to Petitioners’ use of confidential information learned in an official capacity with medCPU, Inc. (“medCPU” or the “Company”). However, the Court held that allegations related to Petitioners’ breach of personal contractual obligations do not warrant advancement. Lastly, the Court held that Petitioners did not release their advancement rights by releasing all claims related to their “employment” with the Company.Read More
In Freeman Family LLC v. Park Avenue Landing LLC, C.A. No. 2018-0683-TMR (Del. Ch. April 30, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) held that a member of a limited liability company, in defending a lawsuit in its “official capacity” brought by the company’s managing member, was entitled to advancement of litigation expenses under the company’s operating agreement.Read More
In Richard B. Gamberg 2007 Family Trust v. United Restaurant Group, L.P., C.A. No. 10994-VCMR (Del. Ch. January 26, 2018), the Court of Chancery held that limited partner, Richard B. Gamberg 2007 Family Trust (the “Plaintiff”), failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to various claims against United Restaurant Group L.P. (the “Partnership”), Atlantic Coast Dining, Inc. (the “General Partner”), and the directors/shareholders of the General Partner (the “Shareholder Defendants”; together with the Partnership and the General Partner, the “Defendants”), which included a mistake-based reformation claim, among other breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims.
In this case, Vice Chancellor Laster issued a memorandum opinion in Edward M. Weil, et al v. Vereit Operating Partnership, L.P., C.A. No. 2017-0613-JTL, granting partial summary judgment in favor of individual plaintiffs, who served as senior officers and members of the board of directors of Vereit, Inc, (“Vereit”) the sole general partner of Vereit Operating Partnership, L.P. (the “Partnership”). Read More
In Mark S. Davis, et al. v. EMSI Holding Company, C.A. No. 12854-VCS (Del. Ch. May 3, 2017) the Delaware Chancery Court granted a motion for summary judgment brought by former officers of the defendant (“EMSI”) seeking advancement of legal fees for their defense in a related action, EMSI Acquisition, Inc. v. Contrarian Funds, LLC, et al., C.A. No. 12648-VCS (Del. Ch. May 3, 2017). In granting the motion, the Court considered whether the plaintiffs had waived or released their right to advancement in the exclusive remedies provision or the seller release provision of the Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) entered into in connection with the sale of EMSI. The Court concluded that the SPA provisions did not waive or release the officers’ right to advancement of defense costs under EMSI’s bylaws and a sufficient nexus existed between the plaintiffs’ role as former officers and the claims in EMSI Acquisition requiring their defense.
In Bennett J. Glazer, et al. v. Alliance Beverage Distributing Co., LLC, Civil Action No. 12647-VCMR (Del. Ch. Ct. March 2, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendant’s motion to stay, holding that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the question of substantive arbitrability when the disputing parties are bound by an LLC agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.
In Merinoff v. Empire Merchants, C.A. No. 12920-VCS (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2017), the Court of Chancery held that a forum selection clause in the LLC agreement of Empire Merchants, LLC (“Empire”) precluded an action by the managers and officers of Empire to obtain advancement of legal fees from being brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery.
Plaintiff officers and managers of Empire were defendants in a separate action brought by Empire in New York alleging that they carried out a massive and long running bootlegging scheme to illegally divert wine and spirits from Maryland into New York. Plaintiffs filed a claim in the Delaware Court of Chancery asserting that Empire’s LLC Agreement entitled them to advancement of legal fees that they would incur in defending that action. Empire asserted that its LLC agreement required such claims to be brought in New York and moved to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue.
The Court first recited the plain language of Empire’s LLC agreement, which provided that “any suit, action, or other legal proceeding arising out of this Agreement shall be brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York or in any courts of the state of New York sitting in the Borough of Manhattan….” It further included a carve-out stating that “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, any legal proceeding arising out of this Agreement which, under [Delaware’s Limited Liability Company] Act or, to the extent made applicable to the Company pursuant to this Agreement, the DGCL, is required to be brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery may only be brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery….”
The Court then explained that the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act does not contain any provisions regarding venue for claims relating to advancement of fees, but the DGCL, in § 145, states that the Delaware Court of Chancery shall have “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear such claims with respect to corporations. Plaintiffs argued that since the Empire LLC agreement incorporated certain terms from the DGCL, the carve-out in the Empire LLC agreement applied and they were required to bring this action in Delaware.
The Court rejected plaintiff’s arguments for two reasons. First, the portions of the DGCL incorporated into Empire’s LLC agreement related only to the standards for duties owed by managers and officers to Empire, not to advancement of fees. Second, even if the DGCL were applicable to plaintiff’s advancement claims, the statutory grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” to the Delaware Court of Chancery merely allocates jurisdiction among the Delaware courts, it does not constitute a “claim against the world that no court outside of Delaware can exercise jurisdiction….” Because this action therefore could have been brought elsewhere, it did not fall into the carve-out, which only captures actions “required” to be brought in Delaware. Thus the Court granted Empire’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.
In Meyers, et al. v. Quiz-Dia LLC, et al., C.A. No. 9878-VCL (Del. Ch. Ct. December 2, 2016), the Chancery Court referred the issue of arbitrability with respect to certain indemnification claims made by former officers of the Quiznos family of companies pursuant to their employment agreements to arbitration and stayed the proceedings as to those claims, while refusing to grant a stay of the proceedings with respect to separate claims for indemnification and advancement arising under a range of other agreements.
In Narayanan v. Sutherland Global Holdings C.A. No. 11757-VCMR (Del. Ch. July 5, 2016), Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Chancery Court held, in a post-trial opinion, that the bylaws of Sutherland Global Holdings, Inc. (“Sutherland”) and an indemnification agreement between Sutherland and Plaintiff Muthu Narayanan (“Plaintiff”) are disjunctive and must be read separately, allowing Plaintiff to prevail on his claim for advancement of legal fees and expenses.