In In Re Coty Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0336-AGB (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claims brought by stockholders (the “Plaintiffs”) of Coty Inc. (“Coty”) against its directors and de facto controlling stockholder, JAB Holding Company S.à.r.l. and its affiliates (“JAB”), over JAB’s 2019 partial tender offer, whereby it increased its ownership stake in Coty from 40% to 60%. The Plaintiffs alleged that JAB opportunistically timed and priced the tender offer so that it undervalued Coty and structured the tender offer in a coercive manner.Read More
In Salladay v. Lev, C.A. No. 2019-0048-SG (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that former stockholders of Intersections, Inc. (“Intersections”) adequately pled facts that supported a pleading stage inference that WC SACD’s take-private merger of Intersections (the “Merger”) was subject to entire fairness review, because half of Intersections’ board stood on both sides of the transaction, and that it was reasonably conceivable that the merger was not entirely fair.Read More
In Olenik v. Lodzinski, C.A. No. 2017-0414-JRS (Del. Ch. July 20, 2018), the Court of Chancery, in a motion to dismiss, found that Earthstone Energy, Inc.’s (“Earthstone”) decision to employ the framework laid out in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide, Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“MFW”) in structuring a transaction secured the benefit of the business judgment rule for its fiduciaries, even at the pleadings stage. The Court found that where the Plaintiff failed to plead waste, or facts which the Court could reasonably conceive as waste, the Plaintiff’s claim that officers and the controlling stockholder breached their fiduciary duties by approving an unfair transaction as interested parties, must be dismissed.
In Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. v. Globalstar, Inc., C.A. No. 218-0351-TMR (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018), plaintiff Mudrick Capital Management L.P. (“Mudrick Capital”), a minority stockholder of defendant Globalstar, Inc. (the “Company”), brought a demand under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporate Law (“Section 220”) to inspect certain communications and documents relating to the Company’s proposed merger with Thermo Acquisitions, Inc. (“Thermo”). The Delaware Court of Chancery granted Mudrick Capital’s demand for certain emails, communications and valuation materials relating to the merger, and denied Mudrick Capital’s demand for certain internal draft materials.
In Morrison v. Berry, C.A. No. 12808-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery held on a motion to dismiss that plaintiff failed to plead facts from which it was reasonably conceivable that a tender of nearly eighty percent of the shares of The Fresh Market (the “Company”) was uninformed or coerced for purposes of surviving ratification under applicable caselaw in connection with the Company’s acquisition by private equity firm Apollo Management, L.P. (“Apollo”).
Delaware Court Of Chancery Ruling Provides a Cautionary Tale for Investment Fund Directors Seeking to Monetize Their Investment
In The Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., et al., one of the founders of ODN Holding Corporation (the “Company”) filed suit against the controlling stockholder, the board and certain officers of the Company for cash redemptions of preferred stock allegedly made in violation of statutory and common law instead of using the Company’s cash to maximize the value of the Company for the long term benefit of all stockholders. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted defendants’ motions to dismiss claims of waste and unlawful redemption. However, the Court of Chancery denied defendants’ motions to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment finding that the allegations of the Plaintiff supported a reasonable inference that the entire fairness standard would apply and that individual defendants may have acted in bad faith.
In In re Books-A-Million, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, No. 11343-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016), the plaintiffs, minority stockholders of Books-A-Million, Inc. (the “Company”), alleged that the Company’s directors, controlling stockholders and several of its officers breached their fiduciary duties in connection with a squeeze-out merger effected by the controlling stockholders in 2015 to take the Company private. The Court of Chancery held that the plaintiffs failed to plead facts to take the transaction outside the six-pronged framework approved by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (2014) (“MFW”), and, consequently, the business judgment rule, rather than the entire fairness test, applied in reviewing the merger. Upon application of the business judgment rule, the Court dismissed the case.
In In re: El Paso Pipeline Partners L.P. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing in connection with a conflicted transaction.
In March 2010, El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership that operates as a publicly traded master limited partnership (the “MLP”), purchased a 51% interest in two entities that owned certain liquid natural gas (“LNG”) assets (the “Drop-down”) from its parent corporation that “sponsored” the MLP, El Paso Corporation (the “Parent”). Parent also indirectly owned the general partner of the MLP, El Paso Pipeline GP, L.L.C. (the “General Partner”), giving it control over and an economic interest in the MLP. As a result, the proposed Drop-down created a conflict of interest for the General Partner.
In this opinion, Vice Chancellor Noble considered defendants’ motion for summary judgment in connection with various breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted by a former stockholder, Richard Frank, against the Board of Directors and two employees of American Surgical Holdings, Inc. (“ASH”), a public company, in connection with the merger of ASH with an affiliate of Great Point Partners I, L.P. (“GPP”). In connection with the motion the Chancery Court examined:
• the “entire fairness” standard of review;
• the effect of a special committee on the standard of review;
• the standard of review for Revlon claims upon a motion for summary judgment, particularly where the target’s charter includes an exculpatory clause;
• a special committee’s examination of projections underlying a fairness opinion, including where multiple sets of projections are prepared; and
• the interaction between a shareholder’s unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty claims upon a motion for summary judgment.