Catagory:Post-Signing Market Check

1
Chancery Court Cites Flawed Process in its Resort to Traditional Valuation Methodology and Reliance on All Relevant Factors in a Recent Appraisal Action
2
Court of Chancery Applies Corwin Ratification to Merger Involving Private Equity Firm Favored by Company’s Founder
3
Dell Inc. Fails to Persuade Court That Merger Price was Best Evidence of its Fair Value

Chancery Court Cites Flawed Process in its Resort to Traditional Valuation Methodology and Reliance on All Relevant Factors in a Recent Appraisal Action

By Jill B. Louis and Rashida Stevens

The Delaware Court of Chancery determined that a flawed deal process kept the merger price from being a reliable indication of value in the Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC and Blueblade Capital Opportunities CI LLC (collectively, “Blueblade”) v. Norcraft Companies, Inc. (“Norcraft”) (C.A. No. 11184-VCS (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018)), appraisal action.

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Court of Chancery Applies Corwin Ratification to Merger Involving Private Equity Firm Favored by Company’s Founder

By: Nicholas I. Froio and Taylor B. Bartholomew

In Morrison v. Berry, C.A. No. 12808-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery held on a motion to dismiss that plaintiff failed to plead facts from which it was reasonably conceivable that a tender of nearly eighty percent of the shares of The Fresh Market (the “Company”) was uninformed or coerced for purposes of surviving ratification under applicable caselaw in connection with the Company’s acquisition by private equity firm Apollo Management, L.P. (“Apollo”).

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Dell Inc. Fails to Persuade Court That Merger Price was Best Evidence of its Fair Value

By: Naomi R. Ogan and Stephanie S. Liu

In In Re Appraisal of Dell, C.A. No. 9322-VCL, (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), stockholders of Dell Inc. (“Dell”) sought appraisal of their shares in connection with Dell’s 2013 “go-private” merger. Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the fair value of the Dell’s common stock at the effective time of the merger was $17.62, approximately a 28% premium over the final merger consideration of $13.75 per share. In making its determination, the court rejected Dell’s contention that the negotiated merger consideration was the best evidence of Dell’s fair value and held that the Dell was sold for too little and that the concept of fair value under Delaware law is not equivalent to the economic concept of fair market value.

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