Tag:Derivative Claim

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Chancery Court Finds That Stockholders May Rely on Allegations Forming the Basis of Other Lawsuits to Demand Inspection of Books And Records Pursuant to Section 220 of the DGCL
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Delaware Chancery Court reaffirms need for factual particularity in assessing demand futility and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss
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DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY DENIES MOTIONS TO DISMISS CLAIMS ALLEGING BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN ALLEGED CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDER TENDER OFFER
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Chancery Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claims against Three Former Members of the Board
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Court of Chancery Addresses Direct-Derivative Suit Distinction In The Context of a Merger Transaction
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Court of Chancery Holds That Sole, Conflicted General Partner Cannot, By Reason of its Conflict, Delegate its Otherwise Valid Power to Manage Derivative Litigation
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Not quite instantaneous, Holmesian “Bad Men” can win by knowing the law: Plaintiffs who tried to preserve direct and derivative claims in a settlement agreement failed to realize that they had already bargained them away
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IN REJECTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CHANCERY COURT FINDS THAT INDIVIDUAL FIDUCIARY MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR TRADES THAT AN ASSOCIATED ENTITY OR FUND MAKES
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Class Action Dismissed as Demand was Not Excused as Futile; Plaintiff Failed to Allege Facts Sufficient to Establish that a Majority of the Board Faced Substantial Likelihood of Liability for Non-Exculpated Claims
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COURT OF CHANCERY DISMISSES DERIVATIVE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO MAKE A PRE-SUIT DEMAND OR DEMONSTRATE DEMAND FUTILITY

Chancery Court Finds That Stockholders May Rely on Allegations Forming the Basis of Other Lawsuits to Demand Inspection of Books And Records Pursuant to Section 220 of the DGCL

By: David Forney and Sean Boyle

In Deborah Pettry, et al. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., C.A. No. 2020-0132-KSJM (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2020), the Court of Chancery found that plaintiffs may rely on allegations forming the basis of other lawsuits to meet the credible basis standard for demands to inspect books and records under Section 220 of the DGCL. Further, the Court granted plaintiffs leave to move for attorneys’ fees and expenses as a result of Gilead Sciences, Inc.’s (“Gilead”) “overly aggressive defense” at the Section 220 phase, pointing to Gilead’s pre-litigation and litigation-related conduct as a potential basis for awarding fees.

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Delaware Chancery Court reaffirms need for factual particularity in assessing demand futility and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss

By: Jessica Pearlman and Mary Nicholas

In a letter opinion, Mark Gottlieb, et al., v. Jonathan Duskin, et al, Civil Action No. 2019-0639-MTZ (Del. Ch. November 20, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety for failure to satisfy, with enough factual particularity, that a demand that the board of directors pursue the corporate claim would have been futile under Rule 23.1.

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DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY DENIES MOTIONS TO DISMISS CLAIMS ALLEGING BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN ALLEGED CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDER TENDER OFFER

By: David Forney and Caitlin Velasco

In In Re Coty Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0336-AGB (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claims brought by stockholders (the “Plaintiffs”) of Coty Inc. (“Coty”) against its directors and de facto controlling stockholder, JAB Holding Company S.à.r.l. and its affiliates (“JAB”), over JAB’s 2019 partial tender offer, whereby it increased its ownership stake in Coty from 40% to 60%. The Plaintiffs alleged that JAB opportunistically timed and priced the tender offer so that it undervalued Coty and structured the tender offer in a coercive manner.

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Chancery Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claims against Three Former Members of the Board

By: Scott Waxman and Pouya Ahmadi

In Jacob Hasher Hindlin v. Lukasz Gottwald et al., C.A. No. 2019-0586-JRS (Del. Ch. July 22, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against three former members of the board of managers of Core Nutrition, LLC (“Core” or the “Company”) for breach of fiduciary duty and the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

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Court of Chancery Addresses Direct-Derivative Suit Distinction In The Context of a Merger Transaction

By: Scott Waxman, Kristin Taylor, and Trevor Kennedy

In Brokerage Jamie Goldenberg Komen Rev Tru v. Breyer, C.A. No. 2018-0773-AGB (Del. Ch. June 26, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) held that the plaintiff shareholder’s (the “Plaintiff”) claims were derivative in nature and that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring such claims. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief.

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Court of Chancery Holds That Sole, Conflicted General Partner Cannot, By Reason of its Conflict, Delegate its Otherwise Valid Power to Manage Derivative Litigation

By: Scott Waxman and Tami Mack

In Wenske v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0699-JRS (Del. Ch. August 28, 2019), the Court of Chancery held that Blue Bell Creameries, Inc., the sole general partner (the “General Partner”) of Blue Bell Creameries, LP (the “Partnership”), was not a disinterested entity such that it could delegate its otherwise valid power to manage derivative litigation. The Court also held that it was not appropriate to undertake a conflict analysis with respect to the individual members of the board of directors of the General Partner (the “GP Board”), because such analysis would disregard the established policy of respecting the legal fiction of the business entity.

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Not quite instantaneous, Holmesian “Bad Men” can win by knowing the law: Plaintiffs who tried to preserve direct and derivative claims in a settlement agreement failed to realize that they had already bargained them away

By: Scott E. Waxman and Chris Fry

In Urdan v. WR Capital Partners, LLC, C.A. No. 2018-0343-JTL (Del. Ch. 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) held that Urban and Woodward (the “Plaintiffs”) lost the ability to assert their derivative and direct claims by failing to properly preserve their claims in the stock repurchase agreements and settlement agreement among the Plaintiffs, Energy Efficient Equity, Inc. (the “Company”), and the private equity group that essentially pushed the Plaintiffs out of the Company, WR Capital Partners, LLC, et al., (the “PE Firm”).  The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ remaining claims for fraud, as the Plaintiffs could not reasonably rely on puffery, and unjust enrichment, as this is more properly a derivative claim dismissed with the direct and derivative claims above.

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IN REJECTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CHANCERY COURT FINDS THAT INDIVIDUAL FIDUCIARY MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR TRADES THAT AN ASSOCIATED ENTITY OR FUND MAKES

By: Scott E. Waxman and Adrienne Wimberly

In the consolidated stockholder derivative litigation, In re Fitbit, Inc., CA No. 2017-0402-JRS (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ insider trading and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The claims stem from alleged insider knowledge of members of Fitbit’s Board of Directors (the Board) and chief financial officer that Fitbit’s PurePulse™ technology was not as accurate as the company claimed. Plaintiffs alleged that members of the Board structured the company’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) and Secondary Offering (together, “the Offerings”) to benefit Fitbit insiders and voted to waive employee lock-up agreements, thereby allowing those insiders, to prematurely sell stock in the Secondary Offering. As a result of their sales, the alleged insiders sold about 6.2 million shares for over $115 million in the IPO and about 9.62 million shares for over $270 million in the Secondary Offering.

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Class Action Dismissed as Demand was Not Excused as Futile; Plaintiff Failed to Allege Facts Sufficient to Establish that a Majority of the Board Faced Substantial Likelihood of Liability for Non-Exculpated Claims

By: Annette Becker and Will Smith

In Lenois, et al. v. Lawal, et al., and Erin Energy Corporation, C.A. No. 11963-VCMR (Del. Ch. November 7, 2017), plaintiff Robert Lenois (“Plaintiff”) on behalf of himself and other stockholders brought a class action for breach of fiduciary duty against controllers and the board of directors of Erin Energy Corporation (“Erin”) for approving what was claimed to be an unfair transaction. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the class action suit under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, holding that the directors were protected by an exculpatory charter, and Plaintiff failed to meet the heightened pleading standard for demand futility set by the second prong of Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). Although Plaintiff pled with particularity that one director acted in bad faith, the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish that a majority of the board faced a substantial likelihood of liability for non-exculpated claims.

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COURT OF CHANCERY DISMISSES DERIVATIVE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO MAKE A PRE-SUIT DEMAND OR DEMONSTRATE DEMAND FUTILITY

By: Annette Becker and Caitlin Velasco

In Chester Cty. Emp. Ret. Fund v. New Residential Inv. Corp., C.A. No. 11058-VCMR (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the stockholder plaintiff’s direct and derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duties under the Court of Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6), because the plaintiff failed to make a pre-suit demand or demonstrate that doing so would be futile.  The Court found that although the facts alleged gave rise to a derivative claim, the plaintiff failed to make a pre-suit demand or plead particularized facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that a majority of the directors on the New Residential Corp. (“New Residential”) board could have exercised their independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand.

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