In In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG (Del. Ch. July 9, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) determined that a special litigation committee (the “SLC”) of the board of directors (the “Board”) of Oracle Corporation (“Oracle”) had properly asserted work production protection and denied lead plaintiff’s motion to compel production on the basis of (i) sufficient need and unavailability of information, (ii) waiver, or (iii) breach of fiduciary duty by the SLC.Read More
In Wenske v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0699-JRS (Del. Ch. August 28, 2019), the Court of Chancery held that Blue Bell Creameries, Inc., the sole general partner (the “General Partner”) of Blue Bell Creameries, LP (the “Partnership”), was not a disinterested entity such that it could delegate its otherwise valid power to manage derivative litigation. The Court also held that it was not appropriate to undertake a conflict analysis with respect to the individual members of the board of directors of the General Partner (the “GP Board”), because such analysis would disregard the established policy of respecting the legal fiction of the business entity.Read More
In Obeid v. Hogan, No. CV 11900-VCL (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016), the Delaware Court of Chancery prevented a former federal judge from serving as the sole member of parallel special litigation committees formed to assess derivative actions because he was not a director or manager of the respective limited liability companies (“LLCs”). In reaching this decision, the court followed corporate precedent in interpreting an LLC agreement because of the LLC’s “corporate-style governance structure.” The court concluded an LLC board of directors could therefore delegate authority to a committee to take control of a derivative action, under certain circumstances, but that authority could not be delegated to a non-director/non-member in this instance.