In Carlos Eduardo Lorefice Lynch, et al. v. R Angel Gonzalez Gonzalez, et al., C.A. No. 2019-0356-MTZ (Del. Ch. July 31, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) examined an extensive paper trail purportedly documenting the transfer of majority beneficial ownership in an Argentinian company from a media mogul to his attorney, before holding that the media mogul should nevertheless be deemed the owner of the interest in question, because the documents (i) did not constitute a binding contract for the purported transfer to the attorney, (ii) were fraudulently induced by the attorney, and (iii) were the product of unclean hands such that it would be unjust to grant ownership to the attorney.Read More
By: Scott E. Waxman and Mehreen Ahmed
In Eagle Force Holdings, LLC, and EF Investments, LLC, v. Stanley V. Campbell, 2999991.08000 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) held that Stanley Campbell’s (“Campbell”) conduct and communications with the Plaintiff before and during the signing of the transaction documents did not constitute an overt manifestation of assent to be bound by the documents. Therefore, the breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims failed.Read More
In Concerned Citizens of the Estates of Fairway Village, et al, v. Fairway Cap, LLC and Fairway Village Construction Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0924-JRS (Del. Ch. March 6, 2019), homeowners resident in Fairway Village, a residential planned community (“Plaintiffs”) claimed that plans and actions taken by one of the community’s developers, defendant Fairway Cap, LLC (“Fairway Cap”), to construct, own and lease townhouse condominiums in the community for use as rental apartments breached contractual provisions of Fairway Village’s governing documents. In its verdict for defendants, the Court of Chancery (the “Court”) rejected those claims, and concluded that Plaintiffs failed to prove a breach of contract and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.Read More
CSH Theatres, LLC v. Nederlander of San Francisco Associates, CA No. 9830-VCMR (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018) concerns the dramatic break-up of a prominent theater company partnership in San Francisco involving claims and counterclaims alleging violations of contractual and fiduciary duties and charges of self-dealing and bad faith conduct. The Delaware Court of Chancery found that no enforceable contract to renew the lease to San Francisco’s Curran Theater existed but the Court did grant the theater operator a declaratory judgment that the principals of the owner had breached their common law fiduciary duties while they were also serving as managers of the theater operator.
In Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, No. 10803-VCMR (Del. Ch. Ct. September 1, 2017), the Court of Chancery dismissed plaintiffs’ breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims against the defendant due to a lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Plaintiffs argued the defendant consented to personal jurisdiction in Delaware by entering into the (1) Contribution and Assignment Agreement (the “Contribution Agreement) and (2) Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement (the “LLC Agreement,” and together with the Contribution Agreement, the “Transaction Documents”), but the Chancery Court found the Transaction Documents to be missing material terms and, thus, held them to be unenforceable.
In Levey v. Brownstone Asset Mgmt., LP, et al., the plaintiff, Gordon Levey (“Levey”), and the three individual defendants worked together as principals in a financial services boutique, Brownstone Investment Group LLC. Operating out of the same office, Levey and the three defendants also ran a hedge fund. In this action, Levey, after resigning from the financial services boutique, sought a declaration that he continued to own equity in two of the entities through which the boutique operated: (1) Brownstone Investment Partners LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, which was the passive manager of the hedge fund (the “Passive Manager”); and (2) Brownstone Asset Management LP, a Delaware limited partnership, which was the active manager of the hedge fund (the “Active Manager”). Levey sought a declaration that he continued to hold a 5% interest in the Passive Manager and the Active Manager, and if he did remain an owner of those interests, he demanded his proportionate share of all past distributions made by those entities. He also sought an order requiring the defendants to identify any undisclosed profits (from which he would presumably also seek his share).
The court first addressed the critical factual issue of whether Levey withdrew from the Passive Manager and the Active Manager on January 26, 2006. Levey argued that he may have tried to withdraw but failed in the attempt, while the defendants argued that he could and did withdraw. The court found that an objective viewer would regard Levey as withdrawing, listing actions that support this conclusion – he turned in his keys, he cut up his corporate charge card and building identification card, and the other principals and employees of the firm gathered together and said goodbye to him. He also withdrew his personal funds that were invested in the hedge fund. Levey argued that he intended to resign as an employee and to withdraw from the financial services boutique, but not to withdraw from the Passive Manager and the Active Manager. However, based on the dislike Levey had expressed for his partners, the court did not find it credible that he wanted to maintain his relationship with his partners through the Passive Manager and the Active Manager. Therefore, the court found that Levey withdrew from the Passive Manager and the Active Manager on January 26, 2006.