Author:Will Smith

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Chancery Court Holds More than Red Flags Required to Allege Demand Futility in a Derivative Suit
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Chancery Court Confirms that Broad Arbitration Clauses Cover Questions of Substantive Arbitrability
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Chancery Court Clarifies the Cleansing Power of an Uncoerced and Fully Informed Disinterested Majority Stockholder Vote

Chancery Court Holds More than Red Flags Required to Allege Demand Futility in a Derivative Suit

By:  Annette Becker and Will Smith

In In re Qualcomm Inc. FCPA Stockholder Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 11152-VCMR (Del. Ch. June 16, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss brought by defendants for failure to state a claim and for failure to make demand or to allege demand futility with sufficient facts, dismissing the plaintiff-stockholders’ derivative action on Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 grounds. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to support the inference that the board acted in bad faith pursuant to a Caremark claim for breach of fiduciary duties and found that the plaintiffs’ proffered documentary evidence suggested that the defendant-directors had yielded to—rather than charged after—red flags raised about the Qualcomm’s compliance with federal anti-bribery laws.

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Chancery Court Confirms that Broad Arbitration Clauses Cover Questions of Substantive Arbitrability

By Scott Waxman and Will Smith

In Bennett J. Glazer, et al. v. Alliance Beverage Distributing Co., LLC, Civil Action No. 12647-VCMR (Del. Ch. Ct. March 2, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendant’s motion to stay, holding that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the question of substantive arbitrability when the disputing parties are bound by an LLC agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.

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Chancery Court Clarifies the Cleansing Power of an Uncoerced and Fully Informed Disinterested Majority Stockholder Vote

By:  Annette Becker and Will Smith

In In re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholders Litigation, No. 11388-VCG (Del. Ch. Ct. January 30, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendant directors’ motion to dismiss brought against the plaintiff stockholders, holding that the cleansing effect of an uncoerced and fully informed vote of a majority of disinterested shares shields company directors from liability for alleged fiduciary violations as to an improper merger price and process. The Court found that the business judgment rule applied on review as opposed to the entire fairness standard.

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