Tag:Entire Fairness

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CHANCERY COURT CLARIFIES MFW PROTECTIONS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO ANY SUBSTANTIVE ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS
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Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects Business Judgment Rule Protection for Stockholder-Negotiated Redemption
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Court of Chancery Applies Entire Fairness Standard to Stock Sale Approved by Interested Board of Directors
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WINDFALL OR FAIR? BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM SURVIVES MOTION TO DISMISS
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Court of Chancery Applies Entire Fairness Standard to PennyMac’s Reorganization Transaction
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Directors Breach Fiduciary Duties in Coercive Self-Tender
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A Conflicted Controller Transaction Survives a Motion to Dismiss
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MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR INVESTMENT MANAGER AND DIRECTORS REMAIN AT RISK
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Chancery Court Dismisses Claims Against Defendants and Holds that the Transactional Structure in M&F Worldwide Applies to Conflicted One Sided Controller Transactions
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CHANCERY COURT DECLINES TO DISMISS FIDUCIARY CLAIMS ARISING FROM A SELF-TENDER OFFER

CHANCERY COURT CLARIFIES MFW PROTECTIONS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO ANY SUBSTANTIVE ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS

By: David Forney and Claire Suni

In In re HomeFed Corporation Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2019-0592-AGB (Del. Ch. July 13, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) found that the controlling stockholder of HomeFed Corporation undertook substantive economic negotiations with its minority stockholders in connection with a proposed squeeze-out merger transaction prior to implementing the procedural protections set forth in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. (“MFW”).   As a result, the Court ruled that the appropriate standard of review for the plaintiff’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty against the controlling stockholder and the board of directors was entire fairness, and not business judgment. The Court further found that two of the company’s directors were not independent and therefore could not avail themselves of exculpatory language in the company’s certificate of incorporation. The Court denied in full the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief.

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Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects Business Judgment Rule Protection for Stockholder-Negotiated Redemption

By: Joanna A. Diakos Kordalis and Monica Romero

In In re Dell Tech. Inc. Class V. Stockholders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 2018-0816-JTL (Del. Ch. Jun. 11, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claim asserted against them finding that the complaint alleged facts that made it “reasonably conceivable” that the safe harbor established by Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), would not apply and defendants would not get the benefit of the business judgment rule.

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Court of Chancery Applies Entire Fairness Standard to Stock Sale Approved by Interested Board of Directors

By: Annette Becker and Marissa Leon

In Marion Coster v. UIP Companies, Inc. (C.A. No. 2018-0440-KSJM) the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) addressed a dispute over the control and ownership of a company following a sale of unissued stock to a company executive.  The Court applied the entire fairness standard to review the stock sale transaction and held it was fair in light of a valuation report obtained by the defendants in the case and entered judgment in favor of the defendants validated the stock issuance.

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WINDFALL OR FAIR? BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM SURVIVES MOTION TO DISMISS

By Whitney J. Smith and Mehreen Ahmed

In Gary D.  Voigt v. James S. Metcalf et. al. and NCI Building Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 2018-0828-JTL (Del Ch. Feb. 10, 2020), the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the transaction at issue should be reviewed under the entire fairness standard and that the plaintiff, a stockholder of NCI Building Systems, Inc. (“NCI”), successfully stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment against private equity firm Clayton, Dubilier, & Rice (“CD&R”) and most of NCI’s directors in connection with a stock-for-stock merger between NCI and Ply Gem Parent, LLC (“Ply Gem”). The headline issue for the motion to dismiss was whether the plaintiff had pled facts that made it reasonably conceivable that CD&R controlled NCI despite owning less than a majority of NCI’s outstanding shares.

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Court of Chancery Applies Entire Fairness Standard to PennyMac’s Reorganization Transaction

By: Annette Becker and Marissa Leon

In Robert Garfield v. BlackRock Mortgage Ventures, LLC, et al (the “Defendants”) (C.A. No. 2018-9017-KSJM), the Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duties filed by Robert Garfield (the “Plaintiff”), an investor that claims a reorganization of Private National Mortgage Acceptance Company, LLC (“PennyMac, LLC”) was unfair to certain stockholders.  The Court of Chancery found that the complaint stated a claim when evaluated under the entire fairness standard of review where stockholders constituting a “control group” stood to benefit from the transaction.

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Directors Breach Fiduciary Duties in Coercive Self-Tender

By: Annette Becker and Serena Hamann

In Robert A. Davidow v. LRN Corporation, et al., C.A. No. 2019-0150-MTZ (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims brought against the founder and two directors (the “Individual Defendants”) of LRN Corporation, a corporation that advises on ethics and compliance (“LRN”) because the plaintiff (on behalf of the former stockholders who tendered shares in the tender offer) (“Plaintiff”) adequately pled facts sufficient to state a claim that the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by launching a coercive self-tender at an unfair price, providing inadequate disclosure, and authorizing the self-tender notwithstanding the Individual Directors’ interestedness.

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A Conflicted Controller Transaction Survives a Motion to Dismiss

By: Lisa R. Stark and Samira F. Torshizi

In In re Hansen Medical, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 12316-VCMR (Del. Ch. June 18, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery found that plaintiffs had stated a reasonably conceivable claim that the acquisition of Hansen Medical, Inc. (“Hansen”) by Auris Surgical Robotics, Inc. (“Auris”) should be reviewed under the entire fairness standard of review because the transaction involved a controlling stockholder group which extracted benefits from the transaction not shared with the minority. The Court denied motions to dismiss filed by the alleged control group and Hansen’s directors and officers.

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MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR INVESTMENT MANAGER AND DIRECTORS REMAIN AT RISK

By: Kevin Stichter and Samira Torshizi

In Cumming v. Edens, et al., C.A. No. 13007-VCS (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2018), the Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a derivative suit for breach of fiduciary duties brought by a stockholder of New Senior Investment Group, Inc. (“New Senior”) against New Senior’s board of directors (the “Board”) and related parties in connection with New Senior’s $640 million acquisition of Holiday Acquisition Holdings LLC (“Holiday”). The Court made clear that compliance with Section 144 does not necessarily provide a safe harbor against claims for breach of fiduciary duty and invoke business judgment review of an interested transaction. Because the complaint alleged with specificity “that the Board acted out of self-interest or with allegiance to interest other than the stockholders,” the court applied the entire fairness standard of review and concluded that the transaction was not fair to New Senior stockholders. Read More

Chancery Court Dismisses Claims Against Defendants and Holds that the Transactional Structure in M&F Worldwide Applies to Conflicted One Sided Controller Transactions

By: Annette Becker and Joshua Haft

In In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 11202-VC (Ch. Ct  August 18, 2017) former stockholders of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (“MSLO”) brought a consolidated class action suit against Martha Stewart (“Stewart”), the former controlling stockholder of MSLO, for breach of fiduciary duty and against Sequential Brands Group, Inc. (“Sequential”), the acquirer of MSLO by merger, for aiding and abetting that breach claiming that Stewart leveraged her position as a controller to obtain disparate consideration for herself as compared to the minority stockholders of MSLO in the acquisition of MSLO.  Plaintiffs moved to dismiss, with the Court finding that the complaint failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Stewart, and on that basis need not reach the question of whether the complaint adequately pleads the elements of aiding and abetting such a breach, and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the complaint.

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CHANCERY COURT DECLINES TO DISMISS FIDUCIARY CLAIMS ARISING FROM A SELF-TENDER OFFER

By Lisa Stark and Dean Brazier

In Buttonwood Tree Value Partners L.P., et al. v. R.L. Polk & Co., Inc., et al., C.A. No. 9250-VCG (Del. Ch. July 24, 2017), the Delaware Chancery Court denied, in part, a motion to dismiss claims for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty brought by minority stockholders in R. L. Polk and Co., Inc. (“Polk”) against the directors of Polk and members of the Polk family, who controlled Polk, in connection with a self-tender offer.  In this case, the Court held that it was reasonably conceivable that the Polk directors who were affiliated with the Polk family deliberately caused Polk to conduct a self-tender offer at a low price to enable Polk family insiders to maximize their proceeds from a future sale of Polk.

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