Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Page 5

In a Reckless Re-price, Results are not Realized

Aug 22 2019

In Howland v. Kumar, C.A. no. 2018-0804-KSJM, the Delaware Chancery Court issued a Memorandum Opinion under Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) denying a motion to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment on the basis that the defendants repriced stock options that they held immediately prior to making a public announcement that was sure to increase the stock price. The Court also ruled under Chancery Rule 23.1 that the plaintiff adequately plead demand excusal. Thomas S. Howland, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), a stockholder of Anixa Biosciences, Inc. (“Anixa”), brought two derivative claims against Anixa and its directors and officers. The Anixa board of directors consisted of Chairman, President, and CEO Amit Kumar (“Kumar”), Lewis H. Titterton, Jr. (“Titterton”), Arnold M. Baskies (“Baskies”), John Monahan (“Monahan”), and David Cavalier (“Cavalier”). The officers included Kumar, John A. Roop (“Roop”), Michael J. Catelani (“Catelani”) and Anthony Campisi (“Campisi”, collectively, “Individual Defendants,” and, collectively with Anixa, “Defendants”).

PLAINTIFF ALLEGED FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS TO SURVIVE A MOTION TO DISMISS

Aug 05 2019

By Annette E. Becker and Annamarie C. Larson

In Chester County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. KCG Holdings, Inc. et al, C.A. No. 2017-0421-KSJM (Del. Ch. June 21, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, and civil conspiracy brought against the largest stockholder of KCG Holdings, Inc. (“KCG”), its directors, and its long time financial advisor for failure to maximize value for KCG stockholders when negotiating the merger transaction due to certain actions taken by influencers during the sale process. The Court held that the plaintiff stockholders adequately pled their claims against the defendants to avoid dismissal of claims.

INDEMNIFICATION PROVIDED FOR SUCCESS ON THE MERITS, EVEN IF ON A TECHNICALITY

Jul 16 2019

By: C.J. Voss and Rich Minice

In Brown v. Rite Aid Corp., C.A. No. 2017-0480-MTZ (Del. Ch. May 24, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the motion for partial summary judgment of plaintiff Franklin Brown (“Brown”), entitling Brown to indemnification by defendant Rite Aid Corporation (“Rite Aid”) for legal fees and expenses Brown incurred in proceedings arising out of a corporate fraud and accounting scandal in 2002. The court re-affirmed the principles that mandatory indemnification is dependent strictly on the outcome of the underlying action and that the “indemnitee need not be adjudged innocent in some ethical or moral sense,” a defendant need not pursue victory efficiently, and that indemnification is based on the reason by which a defendant is party to the action.

Court to Sellers: Stockholder Notice Rights Matter

Jul 16 2019

By Scott Waxman and Nadia Brooks

In Mehta v. Mobile Posse, Inc., six causes of action were before the Delaware Court of Chancery in Plaintiff’s complaint alleging inadequate stockholder notice and breach of directors’ fiduciary duty of disclosure regarding the merger of Mobile Posse. The defendants, Mobile Posse and its board, asserted motions for judgments on the pleadings for all counts, arguing they were entitled to the judgments because the violations were remedied by the supplemental notice they issued. The Court denied all but one of defendants’ motions, finding numerous deficiencies in the notice process and finding that the merger was not entirely fair.

CHANCERY COURT APPLIES AND AFFIRMS DELAWARE’S CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE

Jun 19 2019

By Annette Becker and Frank Mazzucco

In Personal Touch Holding Corp. v. Felix Glaubach, C.A. No. 11199-CB (Del. Ch. February 25, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) found that, by personally pursuing and closing a real estate acquisition in which his employer was also interested, a corporate officer and director had, under Delaware’s corporate opportunity doctrine, breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty.

CHANCERY COURT DISMISSES COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, HOLDING THAT REVIEW OF SALE UNDER ENTIRE FAIRNESS IS NOT WARRANTED

May 31 2019

By: Joanna Diakos and Adam Heyd

In Aron English and Richard Peppe v. Charles K. Narang, et al., C.A. No. 2018-0221-AGB (Del. Ch. March 20, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) dismissed a stockholder suit against the board members of NCI, Inc., a publicly-traded company (the “Company”), for failure to state a claims for relief in connection with allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, and against H.I.G. Capital, LLC (“HIG”) for aiding and abetting such breach during a sale of the Company to HIG. The Court held that the controlling stockholder’s alleged need for liquidity was not sufficient to compel review of the Company sale under an “entire fairness” standard, and that the vote of stockholders approving the sale was fully informed.

Delaware Court of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Suit in Limited Partnership Context for Failing to Make Demand or Show Demand Futility

By: Scott Waxman and Zack Sager

In Inter-Marketing Group USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a derivative suit brought on behalf of a Delaware limited partnership because the plaintiff failed to make demand or show that demand was futile.

IN REJECTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CHANCERY COURT FINDS THAT INDIVIDUAL FIDUCIARY MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR TRADES THAT AN ASSOCIATED ENTITY OR FUND MAKES

By: Scott E. Waxman and Adrienne Wimberly

In the consolidated stockholder derivative litigation, In re Fitbit, Inc., CA No. 2017-0402-JRS (Del. Ch. Dec. 14, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ insider trading and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The claims stem from alleged insider knowledge of members of Fitbit’s Board of Directors (the Board) and chief financial officer that Fitbit’s PurePulse™ technology was not as accurate as the company claimed. Plaintiffs alleged that members of the Board structured the company’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) and Secondary Offering (together, “the Offerings”) to benefit Fitbit insiders and voted to waive employee lock-up agreements, thereby allowing those insiders, to prematurely sell stock in the Secondary Offering. As a result of their sales, the alleged insiders sold about 6.2 million shares for over $115 million in the IPO and about 9.62 million shares for over $270 million in the Secondary Offering.

Fiduciary Duty Claim Against Selling Company CEO Survives Motion to Dismiss with Aiding and Abetting Claim Missing the Mark

Apr 03 2019

By: Annette Becker and Michael Payant

In In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litigation (C.A. No. 12698-VCS), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) denied a motion to dismiss brought by defendants Phillippe Tartavull (“Tartavull”) and Siris Capital Group (“Siris”, and collectively with Tartavull, the “Defendants”) in a case filed by Obsidian Management LLC (“Obsidian” or “Plaintiff”) for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the sale of Xura, Inc. (“Xura”) to a Siris affiliate. The Court held that Plaintiff pled a viable breach of fiduciary duty claim against Tartavull as CEO of Xura. The Court granted a motion to dismiss as to an aiding and abetting claim brought against Siris holding that Plaintiff failed to plead a viable claim.

CHANCERY COURT DISMISSES STOCKHOLDER CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, DESPITE BOARD’S INACCURATE DISCLOSURES

Apr 01 2019

By: Holly Hatfield and Adam Heyd

In Steven H. Busch v. Edward J. Richardson et. al. and Richardson Electronics, Ltd., C.A. No. 2017-0868-AGB (Del. Ch. November 14, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) dismissed a plaintiff’s stockholder suit against certain board members of Richardson Electronics Ltd. (the “Company”) for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court found that the Company’s board (the “Board”) exercised valid business judgment in rejecting the plaintiff’s demand to unwind certain Company transactions, despite the Board’s failure to disclose certain related party transactions to the plaintiff and other stockholders.

Catagory:Breach of Fiduciary Duty