Catagory:Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(6)

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DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT DISMISSES CLAIMS DUE TO A PRIOR BROAD SETTLEMENT RELEASE
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Chancery Court Dismisses Only Certain Counterclaims Against Baseball’s Derek Jeter
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Stockholder’s Challenge to $35M Stock Issuance to Freeport-McMoran CEO Dismissed by Delaware Court of Chancery
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Delaware Chancery Court Asserts Personal Jurisdiction over Third Party Defendants in Connection with Contribution Sought for the Advancement of Legal Fees and Costs
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Chancery Court Holds Bylaw Permitting Stockholder Removal of Officers Invalid in Continuing Fight over the Composition of the Board of Directors of Westech Capital Corp.
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Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Claims Involving a Related Party Transaction with a Controlling Stockholder under Court of Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6)
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Chancery Court Dismisses Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Company and Its Board of Directors Relating to 2014 Recapitalization, But Holds That Contract Claims May Proceed
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Delaware Chancery Court Addresses Alleged Breaches of LLC Agreement
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Fight Between Two Chemical Giants Continues: Akzo Nobel’s Claim of IP Misappropriation against Dow Chemical Survives Motion to Dismiss
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Sound the Alarm? Not so Fast as Chancery Court Dismisses Derivative Suit Alleging Self-Interested “Pump-And-Dump” Scheme Arising Out of Alarm Company’s Repurchase of $450 Million in Stock from Hedge Fund Investor

DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT DISMISSES CLAIMS DUE TO A PRIOR BROAD SETTLEMENT RELEASE

By Scott Waxman and Thomas Meyer

In Geier v. Mozido, LLC, C.A. No. 10931-VCS (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2016) (Slights, V.C.), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the motion of Mozido LLC (“LLC”) and Mozido, Inc., a subsidiary of LLC (“Inc.” and together with LLC, “Defendants”), to dismiss claims relating to incentive options promised, but not delivered, to a former director of LLC (“Plaintiff”).

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Chancery Court Dismisses Only Certain Counterclaims Against Baseball’s Derek Jeter

By: Merrick Hatcher and Joshua Haft

In a mixed ruling, the Chancery Court denied, in part, baseball legend Derek Jeter’s motion to dismiss claims that he breached his fiduciary duty as a director of undergarment manufacturer RevolutionWear, that he violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that he fraudulently induced a contract with RevolutionWear and fraudulently concealed restrictions in his endorsement contract with Nike that precluded Jeter from fulfilling his promise to allow RevolutionWear to announce his role as a founder, substantial owner, and director.

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Stockholder’s Challenge to $35M Stock Issuance to Freeport-McMoran CEO Dismissed by Delaware Court of Chancery

By Holly Hatfield and James Parks

A stockholder’s claims regarding a $35 million stock issuance to Freeport-McMoran CEO Richard Adkerson were dismissed. Governance changes within Freeport that were thought to have triggered an option in Adkerson’s employment contract that would have permitted him to quit and receive a $46 million severance package allowed the board to preempt that eventuality by issuing him $35 million in stock.

In Shaev v. Adkerson, C.A. No. 10436-VCN (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2015), Vice Chancellor Noble, writing for the Delaware Court of Chancery, granted defendant Freeport-McMoran’s (“Freeport” or the “Company”) motion to dismiss plaintiff Victoria Shaev’s (“Shaev” or “Plaintiff”) direct and derivative claims under Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(6) and 23.1.

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Delaware Chancery Court Asserts Personal Jurisdiction over Third Party Defendants in Connection with Contribution Sought for the Advancement of Legal Fees and Costs

By Annette Becker and Sophia Lee Shin

In Konstantino v. AngioScore, Inc. v. Quattro Vascular PTE Ltd, et al., the Delaware Court of Chancery reviewed a motion to dismiss filed by three Singapore entity defendants seeking dismissal of a third party claim brought by AngioScore, Inc. (“AngioScore”) for lack of personal jurisdiction and by the Singapore entity defendants and a Delaware entity defendant for failure to state a claim for contribution and tortious interference with contract in connection with the manufacture and sale of a competing product. The Court of Chancery denied the third party defendants’ motion in part, holding that the Court had personal jurisdiction over the three Singapore entity defendants under the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction, and that AngioScore stated a claim for contribution from all of the third party defendants, and granted the motion in part, holding that AngioScore had not stated a claim for tortious interference with contract.

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Chancery Court Holds Bylaw Permitting Stockholder Removal of Officers Invalid in Continuing Fight over the Composition of the Board of Directors of Westech Capital Corp.

By Annette Becker and Porter Sesnon

In Gorman, IV v. Salamone, Halder and Westech Capital Corp. (“Westech”), the Delaware Chancery Court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, issued another status quo order to temporarily fix the composition of the board of Westech while the ongoing dispute over control of Westech played out.

Plaintiff John Gorman (“Gorman”) a Westech stockholder and board member brought the Section 225 action based on two developments while a prior Section 225 temporarily designating three directors and keeping the CEO was on appeal before the Delaware Supreme Court.

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Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Claims Involving a Related Party Transaction with a Controlling Stockholder under Court of Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6)

By Kristy Harlan and Stephanie S. Liu

In Teamsters Union 25 Health Services & Insurance Plan v. Baiera, et al, a stockholder of Orbitz Worldwide, Inc. challenged the fairness of the terms of a five-year services agreement that Orbitz entered into with a group of entities affiliated with Travelport Limited, a controlling shareholder of Orbitz when the agreement was negotiated and signed. The plaintiff asserted four derivative claims challenging the services agreement and a separate putative class claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Orbitz’s directors for allegedly violating the rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 for failure to make a demand or to adequately plead demand is excused and under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Delaware Court of Chancery concluded that demand was not excused as to any of plaintiff’s derivative claims and that it was not reasonably conceivable that the plaintiff could establish that Orbitz’s directors caused Orbitz to violate the NYSE Rules. Thus, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the derivative claims under Rule 23.1 and the NYSE-related claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Teamsters Union 25 Health Services & Insurance Plan (“Plaintiff”) has been a stockholder of Orbitz Worldwide, Inc. (“Orbitz”), an online travel company, at all relevant times with respect to its claims. Nominal Defendant. The Travelport Defendants (“Travelport”), which were majority owned by Defendant Blackstone Group LP (“Blackstone”), are group of entities affiliated with Travelport Limited, which provides transaction processing services to travel companies. The other defendants included Orbitz’s board of directors when the company entered into the New Agreement (the “Agreement Board”), Orbtiz’s board of directors when Plaintiff initiated this action (the “Demand Board”), and Orbitz’s current board of directors (“Current Board”).

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Chancery Court Dismisses Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Company and Its Board of Directors Relating to 2014 Recapitalization, But Holds That Contract Claims May Proceed

By Annette Becker and Lauren Garraux

In a July 8, 2015 letter opinion, Vice Chancellor John W. Noble granted in part and denied in part the motion of Capella Holdings, Inc. and Capella Healthcare, Inc. (“Capella” or the “Company”) and five Capella directors (the “Director Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims asserted against them by James Thomas Anderson (“Anderson”), a founder and former director and officer of Capella, relating to a 2014 recapitalization of the Company.

Anderson’s counterclaims against Defendants all arise from a recapitalization of Capella which the Director Defendants approved in April 2014.  Anderson voted against the recapitalization, which decreased Anderson’s ownership percentage in the Company, as well as that of the minority shareholders, and increased the ownership percentage of affiliates of GTCR Golder Rauner II LLC (“GTCR”), which, upon Capella’s formation, made an equity investment of approximately $206 million in the Company.

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Delaware Chancery Court Addresses Alleged Breaches of LLC Agreement

By Scott Waxman and Sophia Lee Shin

NewYork.com Internet Holdings, Inc. v. Entertainment Benefits Group, LLC, et al., involves a dispute between the two owners, each with a 50% interest, of NewYork.com Entertainment Group, LLC (“NYEG” or the “Company”). The plaintiff alleged that the Company’s board (the “Board”) was deadlocked because it had been excluded from all decision-making and sought dissolution, and the defendant counterclaimed for various breaches by the plaintiff of the Company’s operating agreement; the plaintiff then moved to strike the defendant’s counterclaim or dismiss it in its entirety. In this opinion, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to strike, and denied in its entirety the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.

The plaintiff and defendant in this case were the two owners of NYEG. The principals of the plaintiff, NewYork.com Internet Holdings, Inc. (“NYIH”), were the original registrants of the domain name NewYork.com, a website that sells and markets travel and entertainment tickets in New York. The defendant, Entertainment Benefits Group, LLC (“EBG”), is in the business of selling and marketing travel and entertainment tickets.

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Fight Between Two Chemical Giants Continues: Akzo Nobel’s Claim of IP Misappropriation against Dow Chemical Survives Motion to Dismiss

By Holly Vance and Stephanie S. Liu

In Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. The Dow Chemical Company, the Delaware Court of Chancery decided a dispute between two chemical companies that were parties to a joint development agreement. Akzo Nobel Coatings Inc. (“Akzo”) alleged, among other things, that The Dow Chemical Company, doing business as Dow Advanced Materials (“Dow”), wrongfully misappropriated intellectual property that belonged in part or in whole to Akzo and breached their joint development agreement. Dow moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The Court granted the motion in part and denied in part. Specifically, Akzo’s claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract survived, but its alternative claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unjust enrichment were dismissed.

Akzo specializes in the design, manufacture, and sale of various chemical coatings, including protective coatings for food and beverage packaging and containers. Dow develops, manufactures, and sells polymeric materials, products, and technologies, including those suitable for use in coatings for food and beverage containers. In January of 2010, the parties executed a Joint Development Agreement (“JDA”) to combine the parties’ respective areas of expertise in pursuit of the development of new protective coatings for metal food and beverage packaging containers. Depending on the resulting invention, any given project under the JDA could either be wholly owned by one of the two parties or jointly owned. Dow terminated the JDA in October of 2011, and then communicated to Akzo in May of 2012 that it intended to file two patent applications relating to potential JDA inventions. In June of 2013, Akzo filed its complaint, asserting claims for: (1) a declaratory judgment regarding Akzo’s ownership rights under the JDA; (2) breach of contract and a permanent and mandatory injunction against Dow; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) conversion; and (5) unjust enrichment. The Court reviewed the complaint under the reasonable “conceivability” standard, the governing pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dismiss, which asks whether there is a “possibility” of recovery.

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Sound the Alarm? Not so Fast as Chancery Court Dismisses Derivative Suit Alleging Self-Interested “Pump-And-Dump” Scheme Arising Out of Alarm Company’s Repurchase of $450 Million in Stock from Hedge Fund Investor

By Lauren Garraux and Phillip Kardis

In his April 28, 2015 Memorandum Opinion, Vice Chancellor Parsons dismissed a derivative suit brought by ADT Corp. stockholder Walter E. Ryan, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) against the Company’s board of directors, Corvex Management LP (“Corvex”), a hedge fund investor, and Corvex’s principal arising out of the Company’s repurchase of $450 million in stock held by Corvex, a move that led to a drop in the Company’s stock price.  Citing Chancery Court Rule 23.1, Vice Chancellor Parsons dismissed the suit because Plaintiff had neither made a pre-suit demand on the Company’s board nor met his burden of proving that demand should be excused as futile under Aronson.

Plaintiff commenced this derivative action on August 1, 2014 and filed an amended complaint on October 3, 2014, asserting claims of breach of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty against ADT’s board of directors, aiding and abetting those breaches against Corvex and unjust enrichment against Corvex and Corvex principal Keith Meister (“Meister”) who, during the time period relevant to the complaint, held a seat on ADT’s board and audit committee.  Plaintiff’s claims arose out of what Plaintiff characterized as a self-interested “pump-and-dump” scheme pursuant to which Meister managed to “pump up” the price of ADT’s stock and then convinced his fellow board members to repurchase most of Corvex’s ADT stock in November 2013 at $44.01 per share for an approximate total of $450 million, the alleged “dump.”  Following the repurchase, ADT was left in a “far-worse-than forecasted financial condition,” with “diminished future prospects” and a slipping stock price that ultimately settled around $28 per share in the first few days of February 2014.

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