In McElrath v. Kalanick, C.A. No. 2017-0888-SG (Ch. Del. April 1, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) dismissed a derivative suit brought by a stockholder of Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) for damages arising from its acquisition of Ottomotto, LLC (“Otto”), an autonomous vehicle technology company. Plaintiff did not make demand on the defendant board of directors of Uber (the “Board”) for action prior to pursuing litigation. The Court dismissed the derivative suit finding that a majority of the Board that would have evaluated a demand was disinterested and independent, and therefore, had plaintiff made demand of the Board, such a demand would not have been futile.Read More
In Robert G. Brown v. Lorrence T. Kellar et. al, Civil Action No. 2018-0687-MTZ (Del. Ch. December 21, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part a motion for summary judgment by the plaintiff-stockholder, Robert G. Brown (“Brown”), to determine the composition of the board of directors (the “Board”) of SPAR Group, Inc. (“SGRP”), pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 225 (the “225 Action”). Denying Brown’s motion in part, the Court held that the 225 Action should survive summary judgment and continue to trial because the defendant-directors, the incumbent Board members of SGRP (the “Director Defendants”), asserted inequitable conduct by Brown bearing on the Board’s composition. Upholding Brown’s motion in part, the Court held that certain disputed written stockholder consents were effective on delivery under 8 Del. C. § 228(e), even though the Board had not taken action to deliver prompt notice of such written consents to SGRP’s stockholders as required pursuant to Section 228(e).
In a memorandum opinion, Samuel Zalmanoff v. John A. Hardy et. al, Civil Action No. 12912-VCS (Del. Ch. November 13, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant board of directors of Equus Total Return, Inc. (“Equus”), ruling that the board of directors (the “Board” or “Defendants”) adequately fulfilled their disclosure obligations because the facts allegedly omitted from the operative proxy statement (the “Proxy”) were indisputably contained in the Form 10-K (the “10-K”), which the Board provided to stockholders in the same mailing as the Proxy.Read More
In a letter opinion, Manti Holdings, LLC et al. v. Authentix Acquisition Co, Civil Action No. 2017-0887-SG (Del. Ch. October 1, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the petitioning stockholders’ cross-motion for statutory appraisal rights under Section 262 of the DGCL, ruling that the stockholders were contractually barred from asserting such rights regarding a merger of respondent Authentix Acquisition Co. (the “Company” and “Respondent”). The Court held that the terms of a stockholders agreement (the “SA”) imposed a duty on Manti Holdings, LLC and the other moving stockholders (“Petitioners”) to forebear from the exercise of their appraisal rights, and granted Respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment on the statutory entitlement to appraisal rights.
In Full Value Partners, L.P. v. Swiss Helvetia Fund, Inc., et. al., C.A. No. 2017-0303-AGB (Del. Ch. June 7, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the plaintiff stockholder’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under the corporate benefit doctrine because the plaintiff’s claim in the underlying stockholder litigation was meritorious when filed and produced a benefit to the defendant corporation.
In Benjamin Feldman v. YIDL Trust, C.A. No. 2017-0253-AGB (Del. Ch. November 7, 2017), plaintiff Benjamin Feldman brought a motion for summary judgment under Court of Chancery Rule 56 for dissolution of a jointly-held Delaware corporation pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 273. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that YIDL Trust made voluntary and knowing concessions of fact during the judicial proceedings that conclusively established the prerequisites for a judicial order of dissolution under Section 273.
In Lenois, et al. v. Lawal, et al., and Erin Energy Corporation, C.A. No. 11963-VCMR (Del. Ch. November 7, 2017), plaintiff Robert Lenois (“Plaintiff”) on behalf of himself and other stockholders brought a class action for breach of fiduciary duty against controllers and the board of directors of Erin Energy Corporation (“Erin”) for approving what was claimed to be an unfair transaction. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the class action suit under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, holding that the directors were protected by an exculpatory charter, and Plaintiff failed to meet the heightened pleading standard for demand futility set by the second prong of Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). Although Plaintiff pled with particularity that one director acted in bad faith, the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish that a majority of the board faced a substantial likelihood of liability for non-exculpated claims.
In B.E. Capital Management Fund LP v. Fund.Com Inc., C.A. No. 12843-VCL (Del. Ch. October 4, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied an appeal from a receiver’s decision disallowing a claim for breach of contract against a company in receivership. The Court held that the appropriate standard of review for an appeal of a receiver’s decision was de novo as to both law and facts, and in particular, that the Court had discretion to consider additional evidence not presented on record to the receiver. Applying this standard, the Court upheld the receiver’s decision, but on different grounds. The Court ruled that the breach of contract claim was time-barred by the doctrine of laches, not the contract’s choice-of-law provision, as choice-of-law provisions must expressly reference statutes of limitations to apply to statutes of limitations.
In Sparton Corporation v. Joseph F. O’Neil et al., Civil Action No. 12403-VCMR (Del. Ch. August 9, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety because the plaintiff failed to state a claim for fraud and breach of contract. Seeking extra-contractual relief from a merger agreement, the plaintiff-buyer claimed, among other losses, $1.8 million in damages caused by the sellers’ misrepresentation of the target company’s working capital. The plaintiff argued that the defendant-sellers’ alleged extra-contractual misrepresentations warranted judicial intervention despite express anti-reliance and exclusive remedy provisions in the merger agreement.
In Beach to Bay Real Estate Center LLC et al. v. Beach to Bay Realtors Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 10007-VCG (Del. Ch. July 10, 2017), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs’ alleged only conclusory facts in support of their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive trust. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of implied contract based on an oral LLC operating agreement, a theory of recovery that was in tension with the sole written document proffered by the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ own allegations about the parties’ obligations to the LLC.